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Abstract 
The paper considers the history of theories of income distribution, from the 
time of Adam Smith until the 1970s. It is divided into two main parts. Part I 
considers the positive theory of income distribution, beginning with the 
classical economists’ analysis of the functional distribution of income between 
wages, profits and rent. It goes on to present the new theories that emerged 
with the marginalist revolution and which were based on maximizing 
behaviour and market equilibrium. The main focus during the early stages of 
the new developments was on the markets for consumer goods and the role of 
marginal utility in price determination. The later neoclassical economists, 
including Alfred Marshall and Knut Wicksell, paid more attention to the 
special features that characterized the labour market and the role of marginal 
productivity in wage formation. In the 20th century the neoclassical theory was 
extended to include analysis of the role of imperfect competition, human 
capital and risk-taking. Also included in this part of the paper is a discussion of 
statistical and institutional approaches.  Part II covers normative theories of 
income distribution and their implications for redistributive policy. It begins 
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with a consideration of the value judgements implicit in the policy 
recommendations of the classical economists and continues with the attempts 
to establish an analytical foundation for welfare economics. The rise of 
Paretian welfare theory with its emphasis on the impossibility of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility made it difficult to draw conclusions regarding income 
redistribution, but the older utilitarian approach, including equal sacrifice 
theories, continued to live on in the modern analysis of optimal redistribution. 
A short Part III contains some concluding reflections on the position of income 
distribution theory within economics as a whole. 
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1. Introduction 
Theories of the distribution of income between individuals and classes in 
society have been advanced in the literature of economics from before Adam 
Smith to the present day. Nevertheless, although David Ricardo in the preface 
to his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817; 1951, p. 5) said 
that the determination of the laws of distribution was “the principal problem in 
Political Economy,” the field has at times led a somewhat modest existence on 
the outskirts of mainstream academic research. One of the reasons for this may 
have been that the study of income distribution is so tied up with normative 
issues of equity and justice that many economists, keen to pursue a value-free 
version of their subject, have tended to shy away from it. Others, however, 
have found this connection to be a particularly attractive feature of the field, 
and have risen to the challenge of clarifying the distinction between the 
positive and normative aspects of the analysis of income distribution; in other 
words, separating explanation from justification. Both aspects of the study of 
income distribution are reflected in the present essay, which covers the 
positive theory of income distribution as well as the attempts that have been 
made to evaluate the distribution of income from the point of view of justice 
and equity. The development of normative theories of income distribution is 
intimately tied up with the analysis of redistributive policies, which in addition 
also have to take account of the positive analysis of income distribution. The 
chapter focuses on theories of income distribution, while no attempt has been 
made to cover the large empirical literature in the area, including the statistics 
of income distribution. Some thoughts on the relationship between theory and 
empirical work in the area are presented in the concluding section.  
Taking this broad view of the field of income distribution, the literature that is 
relevant for this chapter becomes so large that its history cannot possibly be 
covered in its entirety. This is especially so since many economic theories – in 
areas like international trade, public finance, labour, economic growth etc. – 
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have implications for income distribution although the distributive aspects are 
not the main concern of the researchers involved. The treatment must therefore 
by necessity be selective, with main emphasis on the contributions of the most 
important and influential economists among those who have been concerned 
with the theory of income distribution. 
For this reason as well as for reasons of space, the chapter does not by any 
means attempt a complete coverage of the literature. For further references and 
more detailed treatment there are fortunately a number of other sources that 
the reader may consult and that offer complementary perspectives on the field. 
They include classics like Cannan (1893, 1914) and Dalton (1920) and a 
number of more recent surveys like Atkinson (1975), Sahota (1978), Ranadive 
(1978), Asimakopulos (1987), Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) and 
Goldfarb and Leonard (2005). Although not all of these have their main 
attention on the history of thought, they include a lot of relevant historical 
material. The same is true of Ravallion’s contribution to this Handbook. 
All accounts of the history of thought face two fundamental questions: When 
to begin and when to stop. In this chapter I have decided to start with Adam 
Smith as he is arguably the first economist in whose work we begin to see the 
contours of modern theories. The line at the other end is drawn where the 
literature is still being regarded as part of the contemporary set of references. 
This cannot be located with a great deal of precision but has been drawn 
roughly at some time in the 1970s. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. Following the Introduction, Part 2 
is concerned with positive theories of income distribution, while Part 3 covers 
value judgments and redistribution; in addition, there is a short Part 4 which 
contains some concluding observations. This division means that the treatment 
of some economists has been split in two; e.g. Pareto is discussed first in the 
context of the debate over Pareto’s Law and second in relation to his 
contribution to welfare economics. Although this may in some respects be 
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unfortunate, it should be kept in mind that the main purpose here is not to give 
well-rounded pictures of individual economists but to trace the development of 
thought within the main areas of income distribution theory. A broader 
treatment of the history of economic thought, including biographical sketches 
of the lives of the more important economists, has been given in Sandmo 
(2011). 
  
2. The positive economics of income distribution 
 
It has sometimes been claimed that one of the fundamental questions that has 
motivated the systematic study of economics is “Why are some countries rich 
and some poor?” This may well be correct when we consider the motivations 
of some of the leading economists. But for the large majority of mankind who, 
at least until fairly recent times, had little opportunity to obtain first-hand 
knowledge of the economic conditions in foreign countries, one would have 
thought that a more obvious question would have been “Why are some people 
rich and some poor?” This question might naturally have come to mind as 
individuals went about their everyday business in a world of large inequalities 
of income and standard of living. On the other hand, to what extent people did 
reflect on this question would presumably depend on whether they thought of 
the inequality of income as a basic and unalterable feature of the society in 
which they lived or as something that followed from man-made institutions 
and policies that were subject to change through the political process.   
It took in fact a considerable time before this question moved to the forefront 
of economics; indeed, it may be asked whether it has ever reached the 
forefront. Some thoughts on this question are contained in Part 4.  
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2.1. The classical school: Factor prices and the functional 
distribution of income  
By the classical school of economics we shall, in line with standard usage in 
the history of economic thought, refer to the economists from Adam Smith to 
John Stuart Mill who dominated economics during the century from the 1770s 
to the 1870s. The members of this school were chiefly English and Scottish, 
although there were also economists in Germany, France and other countries 
who felt a strong affinity to Adam Smith and his successors1. 
As regards the positive study of the distribution of income, the theoretical 
approach of the classical economists focused mainly on the functional 
distribution of income, i.e. the distribution of income between the main factors 
of production, and it was doubtless this distribution that Ricardo had in mind 
when he made his remark about “the principal problem.” How these “main 
factors” were to be defined was of course a matter of judgment, but the 
classical economists saw them as being labour, capital and land whose 
incomes were wages, profits and rent. The fact that this definition of the three 
main categories of income should have met with such general acceptance 
among economists must be seen as a reflection of the fact that this particular 
functional distribution represented the main class division of society in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries into workers, capitalists and landowners. 
Although as we shall see, there are elements in classical economic theory that 
go some way towards explaining the personal distribution of income, to a large 
extent the functional distribution was also considered an important component 
for the understanding of the distribution of income between persons. 
                                                          
1 Among the prominent followers of Smith and Ricardo in continental Europe was Jean-
Baptiste Say in France. In fact, Say is the only economist outside of the British Isles who is 
mentioned by name in O’Brien’s listing of “the personnel of classical economics” (O’Brien 
2004, pp. 3-9). 
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The theory of the functional distribution did not, in contrast to the neoclassical 
theory that was developed a century later, build on a unified theoretical 
structure. It is therefore natural to present the theory in three parts, 
corresponding to the three main categories of income. 
Wages 
In Adam Smith’s great work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (1776) the first chapter presents us with his famous example 
of technical progress and division of labour in a pin factory. In a factory that 
he has seen, the complicated process of the production of a pin has been 
broken down into “about eighteen” separate operations, with the result, 
according to his calculations, that each of ten men can produce 4,800 times as 
many pins in a day as a single worker operating on his own without 
specialization and division of labour. One might think that this dramatic 
increase of productivity would lead to a corresponding increase in wages, but 
this is a conclusion that Smith is in fact unwilling to draw. He points out, first, 
that the division of labour depends on the extent of the market. Although 
specialization may by itself be expected to lead to higher productivity and 
wages, the demand side of the market limits the extent of specialization. In the 
highlands of Scotland the typical farmer is often miles away from the nearest 
artisan and therefore has to be his own butcher, brewer and baker, and even the 
artisans who are located in the small towns cannot afford to be highly 
specialized. Second, the mobility of labour between industries would ensure 
that the potential increase in the wages of the workers employed in pin 
production would in fact be spread thinly over the wages of workers in all 
industries. Thirdly, and even more importantly, Smith emphasized a point that 
was to become a crucial component in the teaching of the whole of the 
classical school, viz. that any increase in the general level of wages would lead 
to an increase of population and therefore of the work force, and this would 
tend to reverse the initial increase of wages. 
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This idea seems to have been part of the conventional wisdom among 
economic and social writers at Smith’s time. In a passage that reminds one of 
the later work of Malthus, Smith says that “every species of animals naturally 
multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence” (Smith 1776; 1976, 
p. 97). In this connection he refers to Richard Cantillon, who in his book Essai 
sur la nature du commerce en général (1755) had argued that the standard of 
subsistence toward which the level of wages would gravitate must be sufficient 
for a working family to have four children. For experience shows, Cantillon 
says, that only two out of four children will be able to survive into adulthood 
and on average two new adults are required to ensure the reproduction of the 
working class. 
The theory of subsistence wages received its most famous statement in the 
work of Thomas Robert Malthus, whose Essay on the Theory of Population 
(1798) became one of the most influential books on economics ever written2. 
Among the public at large, the book became best known for its dramatic 
representation of the race between population and economic progress. This 
was illustrated by on the one hand the natural tendency of population to grow 
as a geometric series while food production, due to decreasing returns in 
agriculture, would only be able to grow as an arithmetic series. Thus, the 
increase of population would be held down by the shortage of food, and the 
income of workers would accordingly converge to the subsistence level. This 
was to be understood as a long run theory of wages. Malthus did not deny that 
wages for a limited period of time could rise above the subsistence level, but 
this would lead to an increase in the number of births, which over time would 
drive wages back to the long run equilibrium level of subsistence. 
                                                          
2 Malthus’ Essay came out in six editions during his lifetime. The most substantial changes in 
its contents occurred with the publication of the second edition which in many respects must 
be considered a new book. Among Malthus scholars it has therefore been common to refer to 
the first edition as the “First Essay” and to the second and subsequent editions as the “Second 
Essay”. 
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Malthus’ theory was widely accepted by the other classical economists. 
Gradually, however, it came to be modified as regards the essential content of 
the concept of subsistence. According to later thinking, a temporary increase 
of wages might not actually revert to the initial equilibrium level, since 
psychological and social adaptation to a higher level of income might dampen 
the desire for larger families. The level of subsistence would then have to be 
reinterpreted as a social rather than a biological minimum amount of income, 
and this could well be imagined to rise over time. Technological progress, on 
the other hand, had no place in Malthus’ view of the determination of wages. 
The Malthusian theory of wages emphasized the supply side of the labour 
market, while little was said about labour demand. However, the reason why 
wages might temporarily rise above subsistence must be seen as being caused 
by shifts in demand, so that in an expanding economy, a series of shifts in 
demand might cause wages to be above subsistence even for long periods of 
time. The classical economists’ favourite example of an expanding economy 
was the United States (which at the time when Smith wrote was referred to as 
the British colonies in North America), where the extension of the country’s 
territory implied a continually increasing demand for labour and therefore an 
upward pressure on wages. The general conclusion that they drew from this 
example was that it was not the amount of a country’s wealth that caused 
wages to be high; rather, it was the growth of the economy that was the basic 
cause of a high level of wages. 
According to the modern way of thinking about wage determination, wages, at 
least in a competitive economy, are determined by the intersection of the 
supply and demand curve for labour. This analytical apparatus was unknown 
to the classical economists, but their theory can nevertheless be interpreted in 
these terms. The long run equilibrium can be characterized by the intersection 
of a horizontal supply curve and a downward sloping demand curve whose 
position depends on the supply of other factors of production. If there is an 
10 
 
increase in the supply of capital or land, the labour demand curve shifts to the 
right. In the short run labour supply is approximately inelastic, so that wages 
rise. But the rise in wages calls forth increased supply through an expanding 
population. The labour force accordingly increases until a new long run 
equilibrium is reached where wages have come back to the level of 
subsistence, sometimes referred to as the natural price of labour. This dynamic 
process was described by Ricardo as follows: 
“It is when the market price of labour exceeds its natural price, that the 
condition of the labourer is flourishing and happy, that he has it in his 
power to command a greater proportion of the necessaries and enjoyments 
of life, and therefore to rear a healthy and numerous family. When, 
however, by the encouragement which high wages give to the increase of 
population, the number of labourers is increased, wages again fall to their 
natural price, and indeed from a re-action sometimes fall below it.” 
(Ricardo 1817; 1951, p. 94.) 
Profits 
Profit was regarded by the classical economists as the rate of return on capital, 
defined as the rate of interest plus a risk premium that varied with the nature of 
the capital. Actually, Ricardo gave a more general version of this definition 
when he stated that a capitalist would take into consideration all the 
advantages which one type of investment possessed over another: 
“He may therefore be willing to forego a part of his money profit, in 
consideration of the security, cleanliness, ease, or any other real or fancied 
advantage which one employment [for his funds] may possess over 
another.”  (Ricardo 1817; 1951, p. 90.) 
This is very similar to Adam Smith’s theory of compensating wage 
differentials (to be discussed below), implying a symmetric treatment of 
equilibrium in the markets for labour and capital. But this broad concept of the 
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rate of return does not in fact play much role in the work of Ricardo or any 
other classical economist3. 
Although there were considerable differences among individual economists in 
their treatment of profits, we can still piece together a fairly unified theory 
from their writings. One basic question that the classical economists discussed 
was what it was in the working of the economic system that gave rise to a 
positive rate of profit. Nassau Senior (1836) provided a theory that combined 
the assumptions of a positive rate of time preference and the higher 
productivity of more roundabout methods of production. In equilibrium, 
capital must earn a rate of profit that compensates the investor – who is 
assumed to be identical to the saver – for his abstinence from current 
consumption. This is a formulation that foreshadows the later neoclassical 
theory of the rate of interest, in particular that of Böhm-Bawerk (1884-1889). 
In addition, the rate of profit contains a compensation for the risk undertaken 
by the investor. On the assumption that he is averse to risk, the risk premium 
must be positive, but since the degree of risk varies between projects and 
industries, the risk premium, and therefore the rate of return on capital will 
show considerable variation, even assuming pure competition. 
According to the classical theory, therefore, profit must be seen as the reward 
per unit of capital that accrues to the individual capitalist. But for a complete 
theory of the distribution of income from capital one would also need a theory 
of the individual distribution of the ownership of capital since the income from 
capital accruing to the individual capitalist will be equal to the rate of return 
times the amount of capital that he owns. The determination of the ownership 
structure was an issue that did not receive much attention from the classical 
economists, and therefore their theory of the distribution of income within the 
capitalist class must be considered to be incomplete. On the other hand, this 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that there is no mention in Ricardo’s Principles of Smith’s theory of wage 
differentials. But this does not indicate any disagreement; Ricardo makes it clear that he limits 
his analysis to areas where he has something new to contribute. 
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was an issue that did not seem to be of much concern to them. The question 
that formed part of Ricardo’s “principal problem” was the determination of 
capital’s share of national income, not the subdivision of this share among 
individual capitalists.  
Rent 
Rent was the income of the landowners, defined as the rental rate per unit of 
land times the number of units in the possession of the individual landowner. 
The most influential statement of the theory of rent was contained in Ricardo’s 
Principles (1817). Land varies in terms of its quality or productivity. The price 
of corn (Ricardo’s term for agricultural produce more generally) is determined 
by the cost of the labour and capital required to produce a unit of corn on the 
land with the lowest quality, i.e. the land on the margin of cultivation. On this 
land rent is zero. But since the nature of the product that is grown on this land 
is assumed to be the same as on lands of higher quality, all corn will sell at the 
same price, so that a positive rent will exist on all inframarginal units of land. 
Rent is determined by the cost of labour and capital used on the margin of 
cultivation, and the position of this margin is determined by the price of corn. 
Therefore, Ricardo concludes, “Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a 
rent is paid because corn is high.” (Ricardo 1817; 1951, p. 74.) An increase in 
the demand for corn would imply an extension of the margin of cultivation, an 
increase in the labour and capital cost of production and consequently a higher 
corn price. This would increase total rental income in the economy. 
As in the case of profits, the theory of the functional distribution of income is 
of limited use when it comes to the analysis of the distribution of income 
within the group of landowners. An increase in the demand for corn will raise 
the rental rate for all landowners, but the distribution of the rental income 
between them will depend on the distribution of the ownership to land. On this 
distribution, regarding both capital and land, the classical theory is mostly 
silent. 
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What is likely to happen to the functional distribution of income in a growing 
economy? Ricardo’s view of this issue is best explained by starting from his 
theory of rent. Beginning with a time when wages are above the level of 
subsistence, population will expand, the demand for corn will increase and the 
margin of cultivation will be extended. The share of rent in national income 
will accordingly go up, and so will the share of labour, even after the wage rate 
has returned to its level of subsistence. The implication of this is that profits 
will fall and eventually, because of a weakening of the incentive to invest, 
bring the process of expansion to a halt. The economy will then have reached 
its stationary state, but the process towards this state may be delayed because 
of “improvements in machinery … as well as by discoveries in the science of 
agriculture.” (Ricardo 1817; 1951, p. 120.) Thus, Ricardo saw technology as 
an essential determinant of the functional distribution of income, and to this 
would have to be added the social adaptation of the level of subsistence 
income if, during a process of expansion, workers became adjusted to a higher 
standard of living. 
The structure of wages 
In the classical theory of factor prices and the functional distribution of income 
the factors of production were mostly treated as homogeneous so that the 
analysis could be carried out at a high level of aggregation. At the same time, 
it was recognized that the assumption of homogeneity was a theoretical 
abstraction that was particularly severe when it came to the distribution of 
wage income since it was obvious that wages were not in fact uniform across 
different professions. There could in principle be two reasons for this. On the 
one hand, differences in wages could be caused by competitive forces. On the 
other hand, they could be caused by the absence of competition, either by 
private restraints on the process of competition or by government regulations; 
the “policies of Europe”, as Adam Smith used to call them. 
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Adam Smith’s competitive theory of the wage structure is now known as the 
theory of compensating variations. The general idea is that wages will reflect 
the particular circumstances pertaining to different professions. For any 
particular line of work, these circumstances could be such as to imply that the 
wage is either above or below the average for all professions. Smith mentions 
several causes of wage inequality. One of these is the “ease or hardship” of the 
employment. A blacksmith ears less in the course of a twelve-hour day than a 
miner does in eight hours, for the work of a blacksmith is less dirty and 
dangerous, and it is carried out in daylight and above the ground. Some 
professions are particularly honourable, and since honour is part of the reward, 
wages are correspondingly lower. Other professions are held in general 
disgrace, which has the opposite effect. The most detested of all workers is the 
public executioner, but relative to the hours worked, no one is better paid than 
he. 
Smith also argues that wages will vary with how difficult and expensive it is to 
learn the profession, with “the constancy or inconstancy of employment”, and 
with the amount of trust placed in the worker. His fifth and final cause of wage 
inequality is the probability of succeeding in one’s profession. If one trains to 
become a shoemaker, it is virtually certain that one will be able to earn one’s 
living by making shoes. But if one is educated as a lawyer, Smith claims, only 
one in twenty will be able to do well enough to live by it. To aim at the 
profession of a lawyer is accordingly a lottery, and since there are so few 
winning tickets these must carry very high prizes. However, the wage 
differences in this respect are in fact less than a rational consideration of the 
probabilities would imply, because most people, and particularly the young, 
have a tendency to overestimate the probability of success. Smith suggests that 
this explains why so many of the young among “the common people” are 
ready to enlist as soldiers or go to sea. 
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Regarding the wage implications of education and training, Smith compares 
education to investment in machinery:  
“A man educated at the expence of much labour and time to any of 
those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill may 
be compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he 
learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages 
of common labour, will replace to him the whole expence of his 
education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable 
capital.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 118.) 
This is a remarkable early statement of the main idea underlying human capital 
theory which was yet to take almost two hundred years to be developed more 
fully. 
Smith’s theory of the wage structure is based on the assumption of perfect 
competition or, in his terminology, “the system of perfect liberty”. But he 
recognized that this was not in every respect a realistic description of actual 
labour markets. The guild system which regulated the entry of labour into 
some occupations as well as government regulations that limited the regional 
and industrial movement of labour could lead to wage differences that were 
larger than they would have been under perfect competition. 
It is not entirely clear how the theory of the wage structure can be reconciled 
with the long-run tendency towards subsistence wages. Smith’s theory of the 
wage structure must obviously be interpreted as one of equilibrium wage 
differentials. But then, if the subsistence wage is to be interpreted as the 
average wage, some wages must be permanently below the subsistence wage, 
which hardly makes sense. On the other hand, if the subsistence wage is to be 
understood as a long run minimum level, it must be the case that the average 
wage for all workers will actually be above the subsistence level, and this 
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conclusion is not easy to fit in with the classical theory of the long run 
equilibrium theory of wages. 
Smith’s theory of the competitive wage structure came in for a good deal of 
criticism and modification by a later generation of classical economists, in 
particular by John Stuart Mill (1848). Mill argued that although Smith’s theory 
might be a realistic one for the case of perfectly free competition with 
“employments of about the same grade” and “filled by nearly the same 
description of people”, this case is very far from the labour markets that one 
actually observes:  
“The really exhausting and the really repulsive labours, instead of being 
better paid than others, are almost invariably paid the worst of all, because 
performed by those who have no choice. … The more revolting the 
occupation, the more certain it is to receive the minimum of remuneration, 
because it devolves on the most helpless and degraded, on those who from 
squalid poverty, or from want of skill and education, are rejected from all 
other employments.” (Mill 1848; 1965, p. 383.) 
Mill concluded that Smith’s hypothesis that wages tended to rise with the net 
disadvantages associated with different occupation was wrong, and that, on the 
contrary, the true relationship rather was one where “the hardships and the 
earnings” stood in an inverse relationship to each other. In a similar vein, John 
Cairnes (1874) coined the term “non-competing groups” to describe a situation 
where individuals in the labour market were prevented by lack of education 
and skills and the constraints imposed by their class background to compete 
for positions over a wide range of occupations. In other words, inequality of 
opportunity led to inequality of wages as well as of net advantages, i.e. wages 
adjusted so as to take account of other characteristics of the different 
employments.       
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The laws of distribution 
We have seen that the classical economists possessed a fairly sophisticated 
theory of the functional distribution of income. Their theory of the personal 
distribution was less advanced and restricted mainly to the framework of 
compensating wage differentials as developed by Smith and criticized by Mill. 
As regards non-labour income, their ability to analyze the personal distribution 
of income was limited by the absence of a theory of the distribution of 
ownership. A common attitude seems to have been that the distribution of 
ownership to capital and land was determined by historical processes that lay 
outside the scope of economic science. Thus, Mill claimed that as regarded the 
subject of Book I of his Principles, which is concerned with production, the 
“laws and conditions of the production of wealth partake of the character of 
physical truths.” By contrast, Book II on distribution is concerned with a 
subject of a quite different nature: 
“The distribution of wealth … depends on the laws and customs of society. 
The rules by which it is determined, are what the opinions and feelings of 
the ruling portion of the community make them, and are very different in 
different ages and countries. … But the laws of the generation of human 
opinions are not within our present subject. They are part of the general 
theory of human progress, a far larger and more difficult subject of inquiry 
than political economy.” (Mill 1848: 1965, p. 200.)    
It is clear from the context that Mill meant this statement to apply to all aspects 
of the distribution of income and wealth. However, he was also careful to 
emphasize that although the causal factors behind the distribution of income 
had to be studied in a broad context, including non-economic considerations, 
the consequences of different distributional arrangements “must be discovered, 
like any other physical or mental truths, by observation and reasoning.” 
The Marxian perspective 
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The basic structure of Karl Marx’ positive economic theory is consistent with 
the teaching of the classical economists, especially Smith and Ricardo. As in 
their work, his main interest in the theory of income distribution lay in the 
functional distribution of income and less in the distribution of income 
between persons. He adopted the theory of subsistence wages but added an 
additional component which was absent in the work of Smith and Ricardo, viz. 
the existence of unemployment. According to Marx, even the subsistence level 
of wages would not be low enough to secure full employment in the capitalist 
system, and the result of this was the development of what he named ”the 
industrial reserve army” of the unemployed who live in extreme poverty and 
misery. He also argues that the existence of this reserve army is in fact in the 
interest of the capitalists. The reason is that there are significant fluctuations in 
economic activity that also imply large fluctuations in the demand for labour. 
The reserve army serves as a depository of labour on which the capitalists can 
draw without having to bid up wages, which they would have been led to do in 
a situation of full employment. Inequality and poverty therefore serve the 
interests of the ruling class, i.e. the capitalists. 
Marx emphasized strongly that a central feature of the capitalist system was its 
ability to accumulate capital and generate economic growth. So what happens 
to the reserve army of the unemployed with the accumulation of capital? There 
are two effects that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, a more 
capital intensive technology increases the productivity of workers and tends to 
push wages up. On the other hand, the new technology also increases 
industrial concentration, and this effect lowers labour demand and pushes 
wages down. In the context of an increasing population, the net result of these 
effects may well be that employment increases, but the industrial reserve army 
will also increase, both in absolute and relative terms: 
“The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and 
energy of its growth, and, therefore, also the absolute mass of the 
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proletariat and the productiveness of its labour, the greater is the 
industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive 
power of capital, develop also the labour-power at its disposal. The 
relative mass of the reserve army increases therefore with the potential 
energy of wealth.” (Marx 1867-94; 1995, pp. 360-361.)  
According to Marx, therefore, and in sharp contrast to the view commonly 
held by the classical economists, unemployment was a permanent feature of 
the capitalist economic system and was central for a proper understanding of 
the distribution of income and wealth.  
Apart from the emphasis on unemployment, a central concept of Marx’ 
analysis of the distribution of income is exploitation. At the bottom of this 
concept is the view that labour is the fundamental factor of production in the 
sense that all non-labour inputs can be derived from past labour: “As values, 
all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour time.” (Marx 
1867-94; 1995, p. 16.) But workers are only paid the subsistence wage, which 
is less than the value of production. The difference between the two is the 
worker’s unpaid work for the benefit of the capitalist. This is the profit or 
surplus value which defines the capitalist’s exploitation of the worker.   
Marx did not limit himself to the presentation of his argument in terms of 
abstract reasoning but also provided vivid examples of the living conditions in 
contemporary industrial society, above all in England where he lived during 
the last three decades of his life and where he wrote Capital. In this he was 
also able to draw on the insights and knowledge of his friend and collaborator 
Friedrich Engels. Engels’ study of the conditions of the English working class 
(Engels 1845) provided important material for Marx’ own work, but is also a 
significant contribution in its own right. Engels, who worked as a manager in 
an industrial firm in Manchester that was partly owned by his father, was 
appalled by the living conditions of the workers that he saw in the industrial 
towns in England. In his book, he attempts to give a detailed description of 
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their incomes, housing and health, arguing that at least at this stage of the 
industrial revolution, workers were worse off than they had been before. He 
based his work both on his own observations and on various contemporary 
reports, and the book is notable for its extensive use of statistical data to 
describe social and economic conditions among the working class poor. 
  
2.2. Neoclassical economics: The marginalist approach to 
the distribution of income  
The marginalist revolution and the birth of neoclassical economics marked a 
new style of economic theorizing where, in contrast to the classical writers, the 
new generation of economists attempted to anchor their analysis in the 
behaviour of individual economic agents, using the theory of optimization and 
the mathematical tools of the differential calculus. But it also marked a new 
view of the workings of the market economy. Particular stress has traditionally 
been laid on the greater attention to demand as a determinant of prices, but the 
differences were also substantial when it came to the study of income 
distribution. To a large extent, the development of a new approach to income 
distribution was driven by the internal logic of theoretical innovation, but there 
can be little doubt that it was also motivated by the social and economic 
development that became increasingly visible towards the end of the 19th 
century. As an example we may take Léon Walras, who criticized Malthus for 
the lack of logic in his theory of population, in particular for his neglect of the 
role of technological progress. He also pointed out the failure of Malthusian 
theory to explain the actual increase in living standards for all classes in 
society. Thus, after having been impressed by the progress demonstrated at the 
World Exhibition in Paris in 1867 he wrote an article where he emphasized the 
benefits that advances in technology had brought to the working class and 
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confronted them with the “ridiculous theory” of Malthus, predicting the 
workers’ eternal poverty and misery. 
The marginalist revolution and its forerunners      
While the marginalist revolution is usually identified with the early 1870s, 
there were important forerunners of neoclassical economics who in some 
respects were actually more advanced in their analytical approach than their 
successors. Foremost among the early champions were Johann Heinrich von 
Thünen and Herrmann Heinrich Gossen in Germany and Antoine Augustine 
Cournot and Jules Dupuit in France. In the present context, it is von Thünen 
and Gossen that have a special claim to our attention. 
Von Thünen’s main work Der Isolierte Staat (The Isolated State, 1826, 1850) 
is remarkable in this connection particularly for his early formulation of 
marginal productivity theory which he applied both to capital and labour use. 
Thus, for a producer who attempts to maximize profits, he derived the 
conditions that the value of the marginal productivities of labour and capital 
must be equal to the wage rate and interest rate, respectively, and he used this 
approach to study geographical variation of the choice of capital intensity in a 
spatial economy. Von Thünen considered the result of equality between 
marginal value productivities and factor prices also to be a theory of income 
distribution, but as such it is obviously incomplete in that it takes no account 
of the supply side of factor markets, thus leaving the formation of factor prices 
unexplained (except for the special case where factor supplies are given). 
Nevertheless, this was an important building block for the theory of factor 
prices which was to be developed later4. 
                                                          
4 Von Thünen has become particularly famous for the formula for “the natural wage” which is 
equal to the square root of the product of the existence minimum and worker productivity. 
There is general agreement that in the history of thought this should be treated as a curiosity 
rather than a substantive contribution (although von Thünen thought sufficiently highly of it 
to have it inscribed on his gravestone). 
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Hermann Heinrich Gossen’s long neglected book on economic theory (Gossen 
1854) is famous mainly for its early formulation of the theory of the utility-
maximizing consumer and its derivation of “Gossen’s law” that at the 
optimum the ratio between marginal utility and price must be the same for all 
consumer goods. In the central version of his theory income is taken as given 
so that it does not include any theory of factor supply, but he did in fact 
present an extension of his model in which he claims that the supply of labour 
can be derived from the condition that the marginal utility of consumption is 
equal to the disutility of work. Together, von Thünen and Gossen provided 
important elements for the theory of factor price formation and income 
distribution, but it was yet to take a long time before their approach had been 
developed into a logically consistent theory of income distribution. 
What historians of economic thought commonly refer to as the marginalist 
revolution is associated with three authors and three books: William Stanley 
Jevons’ Theory of Political Economy (1871), Carl Menger’s Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre (1871) and Léon Walras’ Eléments d’économie politique 
pure (1874-1877). The central concern of the three main protagonists of the 
marginalist revolution in the 1870s was to establish the theory of subjective 
value as the main causal factor for the understanding of price formation. This 
led them to focus first of all on the determination of prices for consumer 
goods, but they also extended the theory so as to apply to the formation of 
factor prices. The equality of marginal value productivities and factor prices as 
following from profit maximization is particularly explicit in Walras (1874-77; 
1954, Lesson 36). Walras also emphasizes that a theory of the average rate of 
wages – which he considered to be the main focus of the classical economists 
– is not very useful; the analysis of wages must be based on a disaggregated 
view of the labour market with occupation specific wage rates. However, 
neither Walras nor the other two went very far in the analysis of income 
distribution. Although they considered the application of the marginalist 
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method to the analysis of wages and interest rates, they did not proceed to a 
study of how the theory could be used to explain inequality in society. For this 
we have to wait for the work of a later generation of marginalist or 
neoclassical economists, and in the coming decades a number of writers made 
important contributions. Here we shall focus on the work of Alfred Marshall 
and Knut Wicksell, who both in different ways left their mark on the 
development of economics during the next century. 
Alfred Marshall 
The contrast between the work of Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall has 
frequently been characterized as that between general and partial equilibrium 
theory. That is clearly true regarding their style of theoretical analysis. But in 
addition it is striking how much their great treatises differ with regard to the 
reliance on institutional and empirical material. Thus, when Marshall 
approaches the issue of what determines the demand for labour, he does it by 
way of a numerical example in which a sheep farmer decides how many 
shepherds to hire at a given rate of wages, hiring more workers as long as an 
additional shepherd’s marginal value product exceeds the wage rate. He 
emphasizes that the theory that “the wages of every class of labour tend to be 
equal to the net product due to the additional labour of the marginal labourer 
of that class” does not in itself constitute a complete theory of wages since a 
number of other aspects both of factor and product markets need to be taken 
into account5. On the other hand, “the doctrine throws into clear light the 
action of one of the causes that govern wages.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 518).  
As Walras before him, Marshall also argued that phrases such as “the general 
rate of wages” were apt to be misleading, for 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of the relationship between the concepts of net and marginal product as used 
by Marshall, see Whitaker (1988). For the case of perfect competition and full substitutability 
of the factors of production the two concepts coincide.  
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“… in fact, there is no such thing in modern civilization as a general rate of 
wages. Each of a hundred or more groups of workers has its own wage 
problem, its own special set of causes, natural and artificial, controlling the 
supply-price, and limiting the number of its members; each has its own 
demand-price governed by the need that other agents of production have of 
its services.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 533).  
There is an interesting contrast here to the work of Adam Smith and John 
Stuart Mill in that the wages of labour are analyzed from the start within the 
framework of multiple (although interrelated) labour markets, while the 
classical economists discussed the general rate of wages, later adding on a 
somewhat ad hoc discussion of wage differentials. The supply and demand 
framework instead provided a general approach to the study of wage formation 
which could be used to analyze both the general level of wages (assuming, 
contrary to Marshall, that there is such a thing) and the wage differentials 
between occupations. However, Marshall also discusses the theory of 
compensating wage differentials, blending elements from the partially 
conflicting views of Smith and Mill. 
Although Marshall must clearly be considered to be one of the founding 
fathers of the marginal productivity theory of wages6, his theoretical 
perspective was much wider than this terminology may indicate. Among his 
significant theoretical innovations in the study of wages and the distribution of 
labour income should be counted his early formulation of the theory of human 
capital. He notes that 
“[t]he professional classes especially, while generally eager to save some 
capital for their children, are even more on the alert for opportunities of 
investing it in them.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 533). 
                                                          
6 This term has become a standard one among historians of economic thought, although 
Marshall himself would no doubt have objected to it as being an incomplete description of his 
own theory of wage formation. 
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While investment in children by means of education and training will increase 
their productivity and thereby their opportunity to earn good wages, there are 
some serious imperfections in the market for human capital. One of these is 
the weakness of employers’ incentives to invest in human capital. This capital 
becomes the property of the worker, so that the employer’s opportunities of 
reaping the gains of any investment that he has made in him is severely 
limited; hence arises the crucial role of the parents which is limited by “their 
power of forecasting the future, and by their willingness to sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of their children.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 561). But 
although the parents play an important role in overcoming the adverse 
incentives of employers, this role has also other and more unfortunate 
consequences. Because the opportunities and insights of the professional 
classes are not shared by the members of the “lower ranks of society”, their 
investment in their children is inadequate, and this evil is cumulative: 
“The worse fed are the children of one generation, the less will they earn 
when they grow up, and the less will be their power of providing 
adequately for the material wants of their children; and so on to following 
generations.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 562). 
Another point that Marshall repeatedly stresses is the dependence of 
productivity on wages. High wages lead workers to be better fed and better 
educated and so increase their productivity. Marshall suggests that this 
mechanism may be an important part of the explanation of the historical 
increase in wages, contrary to the predictions of at least the simple version of 
the Malthusian theory. 
Both his emphasis on a disaggregated view of the labour market and his early 
insistence on the importance of human capital and efficiency wages make 
Marshall a very important contributor to the theory of income distribution, at 
least as regards the distribution of labour income. About the distribution of 
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income from capital he has less to say. He applies marginal productivity theory 
to the study of the rate of interest but since he does not offer any theory of the 
distribution of the ownership of capital (and land), the distribution of income 
from capital becomes an unsolved issue. The contrast to labour income is an 
interesting one: Since the discussion of the marginal productivity of labour is 
usually framed in the context of man-years of labour (as in the shepherds 
example), and since the measurement of the distribution of labour earnings 
uses annual income as its basis, the distribution of wages becomes identical to 
the distribution of earnings. Thus, the marginal productivity theory becomes a 
much more important element in the theory of the distribution of labour 
income than in the study of the distribution of income from capital7.  
Knut Wicksell 
The Swedish economist Knut Wicksell is an important figure in the history of 
the marginalist revolution and the rise of the neoclassical school of economic 
theory. While the earlier marginalists – apart from von Thünen – had focused 
most of their attention on the analysis of consumption, Wicksell’s main 
interest was in production and investment decisions. It is worth noting that his 
initial interest in economics was kindled by his concern for social problems 
and the issues raised by unchecked population growth. In Volume 1 of his 
Lectures on Political Economy (1901-1906) he argued that virtually every 
problem in economics had to be studied in the context of a changing 
population; however, the population issue in fact plays relatively little role in 
his more formal academic writing. 
Wicksell is especially well known for the first clear and precise formulation of 
the production function as a central tool in the analysis of production and 
investment decisions (including the original introduction in economics of what 
became known as the Cobb-Douglas function). He made explicit the idea of 
                                                          
7 The shortcomings of marginal productivity theory in explaining the distribution of income 
from capital and land were strongly emphasized both by Cannan (1893) and Dalton (1920).  
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factor substitution, and the assumption of continuous substitution between 
factors of production was adopted by later economists as a defining 
characteristic of neoclassical economics. In a more rigorous fashion than his 
contemporaries, he showed that profit maximization involved the equality 
between marginal value products and factor prices. Like Marshall, he stressed 
the incompleteness of marginal productivity theory as a theory of income 
distribution since it did not take the supply side into account. He did not really 
manage to integrate supply and demand in a formal analysis of income 
distribution, but in his discussion of practical issues he showed a clear 
understanding of the nature of their interaction. Although he emphasized the 
role that technological progress had played in increasing the marginal 
productivity of labour, he held the view - in sharp contrast to Walras - that it 
was doubtful whether real wages had shown any increase during the preceding 
two hundred years, while rent in his opinion had “successively doubled and 
redoubled”. The explanation for this he found in the growth of population 
during the same period: 
“Such an increase [in population] must, other things being equal, 
continually reduce the marginal productivity of labour and force down 
wages; or - what comes to the same thing, though the connection is 
easily overlooked on a superficial view - prevent the otherwise 
inevitable rise in wages due to technical progress.” (Wicksell 1901; 
1934, p. 143.) 
As a purely theoretical proposition, this statement shows a very clear 
understanding of the respective roles played by supply and demand in the 
determination of wages. On the other hand, its empirical connection with 
actual economic developments during Wicksell’s lifetime is highly 
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questionable and can only be interpreted as being strongly coloured by his 
neo-Malthusian convictions8.  
A further important theoretical issue in the neoclassical analysis of production 
and distribution concerns the problem of product exhaustion: Would the 
payments to the factors of production according to marginal productivity 
theory exhaust the value of output? Earlier, Philip Wicksteed (1894) had 
shown with reference to Euler’s Theorem of homogeneous functions that this 
would happen if firms’ production functions were linear homogeneous. The 
problem with this application of the theorem was that it implied constant 
marginal and average cost, so that the scale of production for each firm was 
indeterminate. Wicksell pointed out that the problem would be solved by the 
assumption that production functions went through phases of increasing, 
constant and decreasing returns to scale. This corresponds to the case of an 
average cost function which first decreases and then increases. At the 
minimum point of the U-shaped cost curve there are constant returns to scale, 
and this is in fact the point to which the long run equilibrium of the industry 
will converge, given the assumption of free entry. Factor prices correspond to 
marginal value productivities, and the payments to the factors of production 
exhaust the value of the product with pure profits being zero. But even in the 
case where product prices are given, as when they can be taken to be 
determined in world markets, this theory of distribution is incomplete in the 
absence of a theory of factor supply. 
General equilibrium theory 
The work of the neoclassical economists – from that of the early pioneers to 
the first and second generation of the marginalists in the closing decades of the 
19th century – became consolidated in the later version of the theory of general 
equilibrium that was developed around the middle of the next century. The 
                                                          
8 For a more general discussion of the relationship between theory and statistical evidence in 
the work of income distribution theorists see Part 4 below. 
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main achievements of this development have often been associated with the 
introduction of new methods of mathematical methods in economics and with 
the analysis of existence and stability of equilibrium, but in a broader 
perspective one must also include the deeper understanding of the general 
interdependence in the economy that it led to. A particularly important aspect 
of this interdependence was the relationship between the prices of consumer 
goods, factor prices and the distribution of income and wealth. But the 
connection between resource allocation and the distribution of income was not 
given much attention in modern general equilibrium theory; in the influential 
presentation of the theory by Debreu (1959), the term “distribution” does not 
even appear in the index. In one respect, however, the modernized version of 
the Walrasian system provided a more satisfactory treatment of distribution. 
Dalton (1920) had criticized the marginal productivity theory of distribution 
for not giving a satisfactory account of the distribution of income from capital 
and land. The theory treated only the determination of the rate of interest and 
the rent from land, but the distribution of capital and rental incomes had to be 
concerned with the interest rate times the ownership of capital and with the 
rental rate times the holdings of land9. This shortcoming of the theory is 
resolved in the modern theory by the introduction of the notion of 
endowments. Consumers are assumed to be endowed with initial resources (in 
principle both consumer goods and factors of production) as well as shares of 
the profits of the different firms in the economy, so that prices do indeed 
determine the distribution of income or wealth. On the other hand, part of 
Dalton’s criticism remains valid since endowments and profit shares are taken 
to be exogenous and no account is provided of their origin. 
                                                          
9 Cannan (1893) had directed a similar criticism against the classical economists, calling the 
functional distribution of income with which they were chiefly concerned a “pseudo-
distribution” because it was only concerned with wages per head, profits per cent and rent per 
acre. 
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One reason why the new mathematical formulation of general equilibrium 
theory paid little explicit attention to the problem of income or wealth 
distribution was that in its ambition to achieve a high degree of generality, it 
rid itself of the distinction between consumer goods and factors of production. 
Formally, consumer goods were defined as commodities that entered the 
budget constraints as positive numbers, while factors of production were 
commodities represented by negative numbers. Moreover, the focus of the 
theory was on the competitive case, so that there was no scope for treating the 
formation of factor prices, e.g. wages, as being any different from the 
formation of prices for consumer goods. Labour was just like any other 
commodity and wages no different from all other prices.  
In applications of the general equilibrium framework the situation was 
different. In international trade theory the effect of international trade on the 
domestic distribution of income had long been a central focus of the theory, 
and in the 1940s and ‘50s the analysis of the connection between the prices of 
factors and goods moved to the forefront of the theoretical development in the 
field; the classic contributions were Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and 
Samuelson (1953). The focus of this literature was on the functional 
distribution of income, in particular on the shares of labour and capital, while 
the analysis of the personal income distribution was mostly by implication, as 
in the study of sectoral shifts following changes in world market prices. 
Another field in which one might expect the general equilibrium framework to 
be important for the study of income distribution is public economics. But this 
has hardly been the case. One explanation for this is that in contrast to 
international trade theory, public economics has always had a strong concern 
with the effect of taxes on factor supply, while in international economics one 
has often been content with assuming factor supplies to be given. The 
extension of the framework of analysis to incorporate variable factor supply 
leads to significant complications and this may be the main reason why the 
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best known use of the general equilibrium approach in public economics is 
Harberger’s (1962) analysis of the incidence of the corporation income tax. 
Harberger’s model turned out to be a fruitful one for analyzing a number of 
problems in tax incidence analysis. On the other hand, the reason why it was 
easy to use was precisely because, in analogy with international trade theory, it 
ignored the study of the effects of taxation on the supply of capital and labour; 
issues that have otherwise been treated as central in the theory of public 
economics. 
Imperfect competition 
The early neoclassical economists and the later general equilibrium theorists 
focused their analysis of the market economy on the case of perfect 
competition. In the case of the labour market, the assumption was that both 
workers and employers took the equilibrium market wage as given, while the 
forces of competition made any out-of-equilibrium wage rate adjust until the 
supply of labour was equal to demand. It was within this framework that 
theorists discussed the dual role of wages – and more generally of factor prices 
– in allocating factors of production among alternative uses and determining 
the distribution of factor incomes. 
That the case of perfect competition was not a realistic one particularly in the 
labour market was already acknowledged by Adam Smith in his discussion of 
the determinants of wages (Smith 1776, Book I, Chapter VIII). He emphasizes 
that wages are influenced both by private and public restraints on competition. 
The guild system limits the access to certain occupations and thereby pushes 
up the level of wages relative to that of other lines of employment, and the 
government tolerates these regulations. Another point that he makes is that in 
bargaining over an employment contract, the natural advantages are with the 
employers. There are fewer employers than workers, so that it is easier for the 
employers to collude in order to keep wages low than it is for workers to 
combine to push wages up. Smith writes long before the time of strong trade 
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unions, and he remarks that while there are many laws that forbid workers to 
organize themselves for the purpose of obtaining higher wages, there are none 
that prevent employers in colluding for the opposite purpose. He also points 
out that if a conflict occurs, the employers can hold out much longer than the 
workers. A factory owner will often be able to live well without workers for a 
year or two, while a worker will find it difficult to survive for a week or a 
month if he is not employed. The implication is evidently that in many labour 
markets wages will be lower than they would have been in a situation of 
perfect competition with bargaining power being symmetrically distributed. 
It took a long time before Smith’s insights were taken into account in the 
neoclassical theory of the market economy. Pigou’s Economics of Welfare 
(1920) discusses the functioning of the labour market with careful attention to 
the role of various institutions that interfere with competition in one way or the 
other. Since the relationship of the parties in the labour market is one of 
imperfect competition, there is an unavoidable indeterminateness in regard to 
the level of wages. In Appendix III to his book (Pigou 1920; 1952, pp. 813-
814) he has a diagram that shows the deviation of the equilibrium wage from 
the competitive level10, but he does not attempt to identify exactly what 
determines the imperfectly competitive wage level.  
The year 1933 saw the publication of the two books that moved the concepts 
of monopolistic and imperfect competition into the core of economic theory. 
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition by Edward Chamberlin had its focus 
on the markets for consumer goods, while Joan Robinson’s Economics of 
Imperfect Competition also contained an analysis of imperfectly competitive 
labour markets with obvious implications for the distribution of income 
(which, however, she did not discuss except in passing). Pigou’s 
indeterminateness was removed by the assumption of completely asymmetric 
                                                          
10 He also uses the deviation between the perfect and imperfect competition level of wages 
to measure what he calls unfairness and exploitation. 
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bargaining power by the two parties to the labour contract: Employers were 
assumed to be monopsonists while workers took wages as given. This led to an 
equilibrium in which wages were in general below the level of the marginal 
value products with the gap between them reflecting the elasticity of supply. 
The larger the value of the elasticity of supply, the smaller would be the gap 
between the two, and the less would be the degree of exploitation. The 
implications of imperfect competition in the labour market were also 
considered by Hicks (1932), whose book among a number of other issues also 
contained an extensive discussion of the role of trade unions. In regard to the 
theory of income distribution, however, Hicks’ main interest was in the 
functional rather than the personal distribution of income. Thus, one of his 
most influential contributions in the book was the analysis of the effects of 
various types of technical progress on labour’s share of national income.    
The general indeterminateness of the outcome of wage bargaining which was 
stressed by Pigou, also played a central role in the theory developed by the 
Danish economist Frederik Zeuthen in his book Problems of Monopoly and 
Economic Warfare (1930)11.  His theory is set in the framework of a bilateral 
monopoly model in which a firm bargains with a trade union and where 
neither party has any outside option; the employer has no alternative use of his 
capital and workers have no alternative employment opportunities. While 
recognizing the basic indeterminacy of the equilibrium solution, Zeuthen 
explored the factors that would determine the features of the bargaining 
process and the likely outcome. Both parties realize that failure to reach 
agreement will result in a conflict – a strike or a lockout – that will be costly to 
both of them. Zeuthen saw the bargaining process as a series of proposals and 
counterproposals, where proposals of high wages would make employers 
willing to risk a conflict, and this would put downward pressure on wages. 
                                                          
11 Actually, the theory had been presented two years earlier in his doctoral dissertation, 
published in Danish (Zeuthen 1928), which is a broad theoretical and empirical study of the 
income distribution in Denmark. 
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Proposals of low wages, on the other hand, would make the union more 
willing to risk a conflict and thereby tend to push wages upward. At some 
intermediate wage level both parties will consider the risk of pushing for a 
better alternative to be equally large, and this will be the equilibrium wage. 
Zeuthen’s theory was an important contribution to better understanding of the 
role of bargaining and labour conflicts and a significant extension of the 
neoclassical theory of labour markets and income distribution12.  
Human capital theory 
An unsatisfactory aspect of the marginal productivity theory of distribution – 
quite apart from its neglect of the supply side of factor markets – was that it 
offered little explanation of why some factors of production were more 
productive than others. One might argue that this was simply a question of 
technology and the way that factors were combined in the production process, 
but particularly in the case of labour it is hard to escape the belief that some 
individuals are in some sense inherently more productive than others. 
However, some of the differences in productivity might be due to education 
and training. This point was already made by Adam Smith, and we have also 
seen that Alfred Marshall suggested a possible explanation for this in the 
investment that parents made in their children, both with the time that they 
themselves devoted to them and with the resources that they spent in giving 
the children a good education. This would result in higher wages for the 
children who benefited but possibly also in increased inequalities of wage 
income. 
Another writer who pursued the idea of investment in human beings was the 
German statistician Ernst Engel. In his 1883 book on the cost value 
(Kostenwerth) of human beings he calculated the cost of training a boy to 
                                                          
12 As pointed out by Harsanyi (1955a) it was also, together with the analysis by Hicks (1932), a 
forerunner of the game theoretic approach to bargaining associated with John Nash (1950).  
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practice his father’s profession in the lower, middle and upper classes of 
society (corresponding to lower, middle and higher education)13. However, he 
did not have a theoretical framework that allowed him to explore the analogy 
between investment in human and physical capital, and he did not discuss the 
implications of his approach for the distribution of income, implicitly ruling 
out the possibility of mobility between income classes. 
In the 20th century, the ideas of Smith and Marshall were taken up by the 
economists of what came to be called the human capital school. Although 
important contributions were made by Theodore Schultz (see e.g. Schultz 
1961), the theoretical foundations were laid by Gary Becker (1962, 1964). In 
particular, Becker’s 1964 book marked the beginning of an extremely 
influential line of research which also took up important issues regarding the 
distribution of income. As set out in Becker and Chiswick (1966), the amount 
of investment in human capital at the individual level is determined by the 
intersection of the supply and demand curve (or the marginal benefit and the 
marginal cost curve). Both supply and demand curves must be expected to 
vary among individuals. Different supply curves may reflect the income and 
wealth of parents and access to capital markets, while the position of the 
demand curve may represent individual characteristics like inherent ability and 
attitudes to risk. In Becker and Tomes (1979) the framework is extended to an 
intergenerational setting where children’s endowments are partly determined 
by the investments made in them by their parents. This is clearly related to the 
ideas of Marshall regarding the long-term effects of investment in children.  
As with all theoretical innovations, the growth of the human capital field can 
to some extent be explained by developments internal to the discipline of 
economics. However, it is also natural to point out explanations that reflect 
changes in the economy. Studies of economic growth had led to increased 
                                                          
13 Engel also considered the costs of education for girls, but in their case he did not include a 
calculation of the cost of higher education. 
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attention to changes in the efficiency of labour as a determinant of growth. 
Perhaps more to the point in the present connection are the consequences of an 
increasing level of education in the labour force which made the distinction 
between income from capital and labour seem a less central element in a 
realistic theory of income distribution. A society in which an increasing 
number of workers had become human capitalists required a new perspective 
on the distribution of income. 
Risk-taking and income distribution 
The difference of riskiness of income between occupations figured as one 
element in Adam Smith’s theory of compensated wage differentials. In the 
choice between a safe and a risky occupation (shoemaker and lawyer in 
Smith’s example), the expected wage in the risky occupation would have to be 
higher than in the safe one in order to compensate individuals for their 
additional risk-bearing. To the extent that individuals assessed the probabilities 
correctly, these ex ante expectations would be translated into ex post income 
inequality: The incomes of lawyers would have a higher average but greater 
variance than the wages of shoemakers.  
The possibility of formal modeling of choice in risk-taking situations was 
greatly stimulated by the axiomatic foundation of expected utility theory 
developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Although it took some 
time for the theory to find applications in the analysis of real economic 
problems, its use in the theory of income distribution was one of the earliest. 
The classic article in the field is by Milton Friedman (1953) who used his 
earlier work with Leonard Savage (1948) to explain income distribution as the 
result of rational choice under uncertainty. A distinctive feature of the 
Friedman-Savage theory is the assumption that they make about attitudes to 
risk. While the assumption of risk aversion is a natural one for explaining real-
world features like portfolio diversification and insurance, it does not explain 
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the simultaneous existence of gambling. In order to resolve this difficulty, 
Friedman and Savage assumed that the utility function of income had both 
concave and convex segments, i.e. ranges of both decreasing and increasing 
marginal utility. In Friedman’s income distribution theory, individuals at the 
beginning of their lives choose between alternative income streams; at the 
level of abstraction of Friedman’s analysis, these streams could be generated 
from labour as well as capital income. Although individuals have equal 
opportunities ex ante, the income lotteries in which they engage imply that 
some will find themselves ex post with high incomes while some will end up 
in low income groups. The special shape of the utility function gives rise to a 
distribution of income that, Friedman argues, is consistent with observed 
patterns, in particular as documented in his own empirical work with Kuznets 
(Friedman and Kuznets 1945). He also argues that individuals will be 
motivated as participants in a democratic society to introduce redistributive 
mechanisms that insure them against the consequences of the most adverse 
outcomes. According to this theory, therefore, both income inequality and 
redistributive policies emerge as results of individuals’ free choice in a 
situation of equality of opportunity and will reflect their attitude to risk, in 
particular the relative importance of risk averters and risk lovers. The less risk 
averse individuals are, the greater will be the inequality of income in society. 
A further development of this framework is due to Kanbur (1979), whose 
analysis builds on a much more specific structure than that used in Friedman’s 
article. In Kanbur’s framework, risk averse individuals choose between the 
safe occupation of a worker and the risky occupation of an entrepreneur. In 
equilibrium, the two occupations must be equally attractive, i.e. have the same 
expected utility, and this implies that the expected income of the entrepreneur 
must be higher than that of the worker.  Kanbur explores the comparative 
statics of the model and shows that when account is taken of general 
equilibrium effects on the distribution of individuals between occupations, 
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there is no longer any simple connection between risk aversion and inequality. 
In a companion paper, Kanbur (1981) studies the role of taxation in the 
determination of the equilibrium distribution of the population between the 
two occupations.  
On this point, Kanbur’s study is related to the older analysis of taxation and 
risk-taking that goes back to the classic article by Domar and Musgrave 
(1944). Their analysis of a model of portfolio choice showed that under certain 
assumptions, particularly that of full loss offset, income taxation induces 
individuals to take more risk than they otherwise would have done. Their 
choice of more risky portfolios obviously has the implication that their wealth 
ex post will have a larger variance than it would have had in the absence of 
income taxation14. With full loss offset, income taxation functions in part as 
insurance against variations in capital income, and this insurance acts as an 
encouragement to risk-taking. Ex post, therefore, one would expect higher 
taxation to generate more inequality in the distribution of income from capital. 
 
2.3. Non-marginalist approaches 
The marginalist revolution of the 1870s left its mark on the style of economic 
theorizing for a long time; indeed, it remains a dominating influence on 
contemporary economics. As we have seen, it also played a central role in the 
theory of income distribution. But at the same time other contributions were 
made that do not easily fit into the marginalist framework. A common feature 
of the alternative approaches is that they pursued an inductive rather than a 
deductive line of investigation. Some of these will be discussed below. 
Statistical approaches: The Pareto distribution 
                                                          
14 The Domar-Musgrave article did not use the expected utility hypothesis. For a 
reformulation and sharpening of their theory along expected utility lines see Mossin (1968). 
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While the marginalist theory held out the promise of a theoretically more 
firmly based theory of the personal distribution of income, the late 19th century 
also saw the introduction of a more inductive theory of income distribution, 
founded not on a priori theorizing but on inference from statistical data. The 
pioneering contribution was due to Pareto, whose work caused a good deal of 
discussion and controversy during several decades after its initial publication. 
Vilfredo Pareto was Walras’ successor in the chair of economics at the 
University of Lausanne. Like Walras, he was a firm believer in the 
mathematical method, and he saw it as his main task to extend and refine the 
general equilibrium approach that Walras had developed, including the theory 
of factor price formation. When it comes to income distribution, however, 
Pareto’s fame rests not on his refinements of Walrasian theory but on his 
formulation of what has become known as Pareto’s Law15. Many economists 
only know Pareto from footnotes in textbook treatments of utility theory and 
welfare economics and may be forgiven for thinking of him as a pure theorist. 
But Pareto was an immensely productive researcher who wrote on a wide 
variety of topics, both theoretical and empirical, and not only in economics. He 
is a significant figure in the history of sociology and wrote also on statistical 
theory, economic history and political science. His studies of income 
distribution, set out in a number of articles and in his book Cours d’économie 
politique (Pareto 1896-97) drew on his knowledge both of economics and 
mathematical statistics and, in the matter of interpretation, also on his insights 
in sociology. 
What posterity has come to know as Pareto’s law was not derived from a 
theoretical model; instead it was based on a detailed study of incomes statistics 
for a number of countries and time periods. Pareto’s analysis of these data led 
him to the hypothesis that all statistical income distributions have a common 
                                                          
15 His other claim to fame is of course his role in the development of welfare economics, 
which will be considered below.  
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shape that one can characterize as follows. Suppose that we draw up a list of 
all incomes in society from the lowest to the highest. Starting from the median 
income, we know that 50 per cent of the income earners have an income above 
the median. We then move up to a level of income that is one per cent higher 
than the median and ask what percentage of the population has an income 
above this level. Obviously, the percentage is less than 50, but how much less? 
Pareto found that the answer was 1.5 per cent; in other words, as the level of 
income goes up by 1 per cent, the number of individuals with an income above 
this level falls by 1.5 per cent. In general mathematical terms Pareto wrote his 
law as 
logN = logA – αlogy. 
Here N is the number of individuals who have an income of at least y and A is 
a parameter that reflects the size of the population. α is Pareto’s constant that 
he estimated to be approximately equal to 1.5. The relationship has the 
interesting property that the average income of those whose incomes are 
greater than y will be equal to α/(α-1) times y. Thus, once again assuming that 
α = 1.5, the average income of those with incomes above 10.000 francs should 
be equal to 15.000 francs. In the economies that Pareto studied, it turned out 
that the fit of the function was remarkably good, although less so at the tails of 
the income distribution. Later work has tended to establish that the fit is 
significantly better for the upper ranges of the distribution, i.e. for the right end 
of the income distribution curve. 
Pareto’s law came in for a good deal of controversy. Thus, a long discussion 
involving several participants arose regarding Pareto’s claim that the 
parameter α could be used as an index of inequality. That this claim should 
turn out to be controversial will come as no surprise to the modern economist 
who from the work of Atkinson (1970) and others has been made aware that 
any particular index of inequality is implicitly based on some ethical judgment 
about the nature of inequality. The question of the conditions required for 
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social welfare to be written as a function of mean income and inequality as 
measured by Pareto’s α (increasing in the former, decreasing in the latter) was 
settled by Chipman (1974). Having this issue clarified is of obvious interest. 
However, there were other aspects of the controversy that are arguably of 
greater general importance. 
One question that naturally arises concerns the empirical validity of the law. 
Did Pareto actually claim the law to be one of universal validity? Here his 
statements do not provide an unambiguous answer. On the one hand he noted 
in a comment on his empirical findings that 
“[t]hese results are very remarkable. It is absolutely impossible to 
assume that they are due solely to chance. There must certainly be a 
cause which produces a tendency for incomes to be distributed along a 
certain curve. The form of this curve seems to depend only slightly on 
different economic conditions of the countries considered, since the 
effects are about the same for countries in which economic conditions 
are as diverse as those of England, Ireland, Germany, Italian cities and 
even Peru.” 
However, he went on to issue a word of caution: 
“True, since we are dealing only with empirical laws, we cannot be too 
prudent. In any case, the consequences we shall draw from this law will 
at least always be valid for peoples for whom we have seen that they 
are confirmed.” (Pareto 1896-97, vol. II; quoted from Chipman 1976, 
p. 151.) 
In spite of this and other cautionary statements Pareto was frequently 
interpreted as claiming universal validity for his law. Such a claim naturally 
proved provocative to many who believed that governments should see it as 
one of their objectives to bring about a more egalitarian distribution of income. 
On the one hand Pareto seemed to claim that the distribution of factor incomes 
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was given; on the other hand he also went out of his way to point out that, 
given the skewness embedded in the Pareto distribution of incomes, 
progressive taxation could only be counted on to provide a rather insignificant 
redistribution of income in favour of the poor. This was seen by many as proof 
of Pareto’s alleged reactionary attitudes; however, this view is not supported 
by statements such as  
“… even with taxes at an equal percentage of incomes, the rich 
contribute far less to public expenditures that the poor, whereas they 
benefit much more from them. For whom, if not for the vain rich, are 
funds expended on armaments and the like?” (Pareto 1895; quoted 
from Chipman 1976, p. 115.)  
However, it was the early presentation of Pareto, rather than his later and more 
cautious statements, that caught the attention of other economists, and a 
considerable amount of work was devoted to examining and criticizing his law 
of income distribution. Thus, in his Economics of Welfare (1920) Pigou 
devoted a whole chapter (Part IV, Chapter II) to a critical examination of 
Pareto’s Law.  In the preceding short chapter Pigou had sketched the principles 
underlying the equity-efficiency tradeoff (to use a more modern expression), 
arguing from a utilitarian perspective that any cause that increases the 
“national dividend” without lowering the absolute share of the poor, or 
increases the absolute share of the poor without reducing the national 
dividend, must increase welfare. By contrast, the welfare effect of any measure 
that increases one of these quantities but diminishes the other is ambiguous: 
“Plainly, when this kind of disharmony exists, the aggregate effect 
upon economic  welfare, brought about by any cause responsible for it, 
can only be determined by balancing in detail the injury (or benefit) to 
the dividend as a whole against the benefit (or injury) to the real 
earnings of the lower classes.” (Pigou 1920; 1932, p. 645.) 
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Pigou then went on to point out that according to one “interesting thesis” there 
was no need to be concerned about these cases of disharmony:  Pareto’s 
alleged law of income distribution implied that, since the relative shares of the 
different income groups were at least approximately constant, the only way to 
ensure an increase in the absolute share of the poor was to increase the 
national dividend. Pigou was clearly skeptical to the conclusion and also 
expressed strong doubts with respect to several aspects of Pareto’s work. He 
criticized the empirical basis for Pareto’s generalization, but a more important 
point that he raised concerns the basis for assuming a given distribution 
relating to all sources of income. Pareto’s distribution is skewed to the left, and 
Pigou argued that in the case of labour income one would rather like to assume 
that the distribution of “capacities” follows the normal distribution16. He also 
pointed out, however, that capacity is a multi-dimensional concept, and that 
although manual and mental capacity might both be normally distributed, their 
joint distribution would not be, and this fact might go some way towards 
explaining the form of the Pareto distribution. On the other hand, the reference 
to capacity, whether manual or mental, does not explain the distribution of 
income from capital or property, which is largely determined by inheritance, 
the importance of which depends in a crucial manner on the nature of legal and 
political institutions. The view that the distribution of income, and in particular 
the share of the poor, cannot be affected by measures of economic policy 
therefore becomes untenable. 
Towards the end of the chapter Pigou quotes Pareto as remarking about his 
own distribution that 
                                                          
16 If capacity is taken to mean marginal productivity it is of course not sufficient to argue that 
the normal distribution of capacity is reflected in a corresponding normal distribution of 
wages. According to marginal productivity theory wages correspond (under competitive 
conditions) to the value of the marginal products, so that the distribution of wages also 
depends on the distribution of product prices and accordingly on the distribution of workers 
between industries.  
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“[some] persons would deduce from it a general law as to the only way 
in which the inequality of incomes can be diminished. But such a 
conclusion far transcends anything that can be derived from the 
premises. Empirical laws, like those with which we are here concerned, 
have little or no value outside the limits for which they were found 
experimentally to be true.” (Pigou 1920; 1932, p. 655.) 
So it appears that Pigou’s criticism of Pareto to some extent missed its target. 
That it still was felt to be necessary to devote a chapter to it in 1920 must be 
explained by the popular attention that Pareto’s original formulation had 
attracted. The idea that the distribution of income was determined by a sort of 
immutable law appeared to have far-reaching consequences for the feasibility 
– or rather infeasibility - of redistributive policies. 
Pigou was not the only economist to be critical of Pareto’s law of income 
distribution. Edgeworth (1896) at an early stage of the debate argued that 
Pareto’s contribution bore strong similarities to previous work by the English 
statistician Karl Pearson. Pareto reacted strongly to what he saw as an 
accusation of plagiarism and gave a heated reply in which he remarked that “it 
must have displeased Mr. Edgeworth to see me poach on territory which is 
apparently reserved for Professor Pearson, just as political economy is 
reserved for Professor Marshall.” (Pareto 1896). Further exchanges did little to 
soften the tone of the debate, and as late as 1926, three years after Pareto’s 
death, Edgeworth wrote about Pareto’s reaction that it ”is of interest as 
throwing light not only on the character of the curve, but also on that of its 
discoverer.” (Edgeworth 1926; 2003, p. 492.) 
Pareto’s formulation of his law as well as the later controversies to which it 
gave rise constitute an interesting episode in the history of economic thought, 
and the Pareto distribution continues to play a role in the empirical study of 
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income distribution. Although it has received a good deal of criticism, it has 
also been hailed as a milestone in the empirical study of income distribution17. 
Other statistical approaches 
The tradition established by Pareto’s work to look for regularities or empirical 
laws in the distribution of income was continued by a number of later writers. 
A characteristic feature of this literature is that the authors do not attempt to 
found their hypotheses on the neoclassical theory of factor market equilibrium 
but start instead from some observed empirical regularity, just as Pareto did. 
Just a few examples of this approach will be given here.  
Roy (1950, 1951) claimed that observed earnings distributions could be 
reasonably approximated by the lognormal distribution and argued, echoing 
Pareto, that “[t]here must be some rational explanation of the fact that all these 
earnings’ distributions have such similar shapes” (Roy 1950, p. 490). He 
attempts to discover this explanation by studying a number of industrial cases 
in which workers perform a standard and identical task and where individual 
output is easy to measure. These include tasks like packing boxes of chocolate, 
stitching shoes and pressing gramophone records. Altogether, for the twelve 
different cases studied it turned out that the lognormal distribution performed 
slightly better than the normal. To the extent that people are paid according to 
output, this result could go some of the way towards explaining the earnings 
distribution in terms of the distribution of individual skills. In Roy (1951) he 
studies the theoretical case of a “primitive” society in which people can choose 
to work in two or more occupations and where their skills differ between 
occupations. He then discusses how different skill correlations give rise to 
different statistical earnings distributions (always assuming that earnings are 
proportional to output), emphasizing the central role played by the lognormal 
                                                          
17 For a survey of the statistical literature which, although critical, takes an overall positive 
view of Pareto’s contribution, see Bresciani-Turroni (1939). A balanced survey of the 
controversy surrounding Pareto’s Law is the article by Chipman (1963). 
46 
 
distribution. Champernowne (1953) considered a dynamic model in which it is 
assumed that every income earner has a probability of a rise or fall in income 
between one period and the next which is proportionate to his income in the 
first period. He showed that over time this will result in convergence towards 
the Pareto distribution. In a comment on this article, Lydall (1959) argued that 
this stochastic process was implausible for labour incomes and showed that the 
Pareto distribution could be generated on the alternative assumption that in an 
industrial firm each supervisor controls the same number of persons and that 
he is paid according to the total income of those below him. A similar 
assumption about the pyramidal structure of organizations is employed by 
Herbert Simon (1957) in his analysis of the compensation of executives. 
A different and more macroeconomic approach was taken by Kuznets (1955), 
whose goal was to explain the long term trends in the inequality of income in 
the economy as a whole. While on the basis of data for the United States, 
England and Germany he found that income inequality had decreased after the 
end of the First World War, he suggested that this period had been preceded by 
one of increasing inequality. In his view, the period of widening income gaps 
began with the industrial revolution in the late 18th century; for England he 
suggested that it ended around the middle of the 19th century and for the others 
a few decades later18. His explanation for this development was based on the 
shifts from the agricultural or traditional sector of the economy to the non-
agricultural or modern sector where income from capital plays a larger role for 
the distribution of income. Initially, inequality is larger in the modern sector 
than in the traditional one, and this generates an increased inequality of income 
for society as a whole as the modern sector expands. Over time, however, as 
the modern sector becomes more mature a variety of forces combine to reduce 
                                                          
18 Setting the date of the change from the first to the second phase at roughly 1850 for 
England, Kuznets suggests that Marx’s view of the inevitable rise of inequality of income 
under capitalism may have been an overgeneralization from observations of the last stages 
of the first phase.  
47 
 
inequality there, particularly through an increased share of the lower income 
groups and a lowering of the income from capital. Consequently, overall 
inequality diminishes. In his own words:  
“One might thus assume a long swing in the inequality characterizing 
the secular income structure; widening in the early phases of economic 
growth when the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial 
civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized for a while; and then 
narrowing in the later phases.” (Kuznets 1955, p. 18.)  
This hypothesis is what has become known as the Kuznets curve in the form of 
a bell-shaped curve describing the relationship between per capita income and 
the degree of inequality. It should be emphasized, however, that Kuznets was 
careful to point out the inadequacy of the empirical evidence for the 
hypothesis, particular as regards the earlier phase of economic growth.    
The various statistical approaches to the study of income distribution are 
attempts to rationalize the observed distribution of income by using some 
stylized facts or assumptions about the generation of income to explain 
observed patterns of the distribution of income. To call these approaches non-
theoretical might be somewhat misleading; however, it is clearly the case that 
they are not founded on theories of optimizing behavior and market 
equilibrium.         
Institutional theories of income distribution 
There have always been economists who were skeptical to the central role 
played by formal models in economic theory. In the area of income 
distribution we have seen that even a prominent theorist like John Stuart Mill 
argued that “the laws of distribution” must be understood in a political and 
social context, and since this context was determined by institutions, the 
understanding of the distribution of income and wealth would have to take 
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proper account of institutions in addition to the mechanism of demand and 
supply. Karl Marx emphasized that the distribution of income in the society of 
his time reflected the particular phase of social development that he called 
capitalism. Along similar lines, the German historical school, led by Wilhelm 
Roscher and Gustav Schmoller, downplayed the role of theory in favour of an 
approach based on a detailed study of historical data. If successfully carried 
out, this line of research would presumably be less able than e.g. the marginal 
productivity theory to offer explanations with a claim to universal validity; on 
the other hand, it might hold out a promise of generating more insights with 
relevance for the particular society being studied. 
It was especially in the United States that institutional approaches to the study 
of the economic system received a position that made many regard it as an 
important alternative to the theoretical approach of the neoclassical school of 
economists. Thorstein Veblen is widely regarded as the founder of American 
institutional economics, but his approach - more satirical than analytical - in 
books like The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) and The Theory of Business 
Enterprise (1904) was too idiosyncratic to attract many direct followers19. 
Neither he nor the other most prominent members of the institutional school, 
John R. Commons and Wesley C. Mitchell, paid particular attention to the 
distribution of income except for a general emphasis on the importance of 
power relations and evolutionary processes. The chief importance of the 
institutional school may have been as critics of the neoclassical theory in its 
focus on rational behavior and competitive equilibria. But the lack of general 
propositions in the work of the institutional school contributed to its gradual 
decline as an influence on modern economics. 
                                                          
19 The closest that one may come to such a follower is perhaps John Kenneth Galbraith, 
whose satirical style and skepticism towards mainstream economics are in many ways 
reminiscent of Veblen. His book The Affluent Society (1958) contains several discussions of 
issues of income distribution with criticism of mainstream views but does not offer any 
alternative explanations of observed patterns of inequality. 
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An interesting question that arises in the study of the effects of institutions on 
the economy is: What constitutes an institution? Here Veblen adopted a broad 
definition which encompassed “settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of men.” A modern version of this idea came with Gary Becker’s 
work on the economics of discrimination (Becker 1957), in which racial 
discrimination in the labour market is assumed to arise from a common 
preference for not working alongside people with a different skin colour. In 
pursuing the implications of this idea, Becker may be said to have followed the 
guidelines for economic research recommended by the institutional 
economists; however, the tools that he used in this work were entirely 
neoclassical. 
As regards the inequality of wage income, important contributions have been 
made by specialists in labour economics and industrial relations. It is natural to 
group these with the institutional economists because like them they 
emphasize the crucial role of institutions for the understanding of the 
distribution of income, specifically the distribution of wage income. In the 
United States, the work of Dunlop (1944, 1958) described wages as 
determined by the interaction between company owners, management and 
workers as represented by trade unions20. The book by Phelps Brown (1977) 
collects a number of his studies of wage inequality in different countries and 
under different economic systems. His work is notable for the attempt to 
explain inequality of pay by drawing both on economic and sociological 
approaches, paying attention to such factors as social class and status, 
discrimination, intergenerational mobility and mental ability.      
                                                          
20 It should be noted that Dunlop’s work is not institutional in the sense of showing aversion 
to theoretical modeling. As an example, in his 1944 book he discusses the formal 
mathematical modeling of trade union behavior in a situation of unemployment, analyzing 
the relationship between the union’s wage claim and the rate of unemployment 
compensation and thereby the distribution of income between the employed and the 
unemployed. This analysis foreshadows the numerous contributions to the theory of trade 
union behavior in the 1970s and ‘80s.  
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The role of property ownership and inheritance 
The role of inheritance as a determinant of income distribution has received 
relatively little attention in the theoretical literature. In the world of the early 
neoclassical economists and the later general equilibrium theorists the subject 
did not fit easily into their models. The time dimension – essential to get a grip 
on inheritance – could indeed be added through the introduction of time-dating 
consumer goods as well as factors of production, but this failed to provide a 
convincing picture of the nature of inheritance. In the world of general 
equilibrium theory, as described e.g. in the book by Arrow and Hahn (1971), 
property ownership was represented by “endowments”, initial holding of 
goods and factors of production that were taken as exogenous. But models of 
this type are unable to explain the passing on of property from parents to 
children and the persistence of inequality between generations. The nature of 
these intergenerational transfers is determined by the rules of inheritance, 
which will therefore have an important influence on the distribution of income 
and wealth. But as Dalton remarked almost a century ago, 
“Many thinkers of high reputation still talk, or remain silent, about the 
law of inheritance, as though it had fallen immutable from heaven into 
the Garden of Eden.” (Dalton 1920, p. 285.)   
Meade (1964) considered the development of the personal distribution of 
wealth on the background of what he saw as the likely development of the 
functional distribution of income. In his view, the dominating technological 
trend was towards “automation” which would imply a significant reduction in 
the demand for labour and falling wages. This would lead to a shift in the 
functional distribution of income away from labour and in favour of income 
from property. Since, as he pointed out, income from property is much more 
unequally distributed than income from labour, this shift would imply a greater 
overall inequality in the population. This trend towards increased inequality in 
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the distribution of income might in Meade’s view be reinforced by 
demographic factors, such as higher rates of growth for large than for small 
fortunes (due to better opportunities for diversification), the genetic 
inheritance of earning power and the tendency towards assortative mating (the 
rich marrying the rich). As later pointed out by Stiglitz (1969), it could also be 
influenced by the rules governing inheritance, either by law or custom. If all 
wealth goes to the first born (primogeniture), this leads to a more unequal 
distribution of wealth than the alternative of dividing wealth equally among 
one’s children.  
Inheritance is of obvious importance not only for material wealth but also for 
human capital. We have seen that this point had already been emphasized by 
Marshall (1890), and some decades later Cannan argued that the individual 
qualities required both to earn a good income from labour and to manage one’s 
property wisely were passed on from one generation to the next, so that this 
tended to stabilize the degree of inequality over time. However, this tendency 
was not without exceptions: 
“The able members of the poorest class are constantly rising to the top, 
and the particularly incompetent members of the richest class are 
constantly falling to the bottom; but all the same, among the bulk of 
mankind there is a continuous hereditary transmission of inequality of 
income, the importance of which it is foolish to ignore.” (Cannan 1914; 
1928, p. 217.)  
The role of inheritance in determining the degree of inequality in the 
ownership of property is obviously an important one and requires attention to 
the broader subject of what Mill called “the laws and customs of society.” 
Perhaps his warning, that this was a much larger and more difficult subject 
than economics, played some role in the development that led economists 
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largely to neglect this important aspect of the distribution of income and 
wealth.    
  
3. Value judgments and redistribution. 
   
The interest in the question “Why are some people rich and some poor?” has 
always been motivated by something more than pure intellectual curiosity. A 
notable feature of the observed distribution of income has always been that it 
is unequal, and a natural second question is therefore “Can inequality be 
justified?” A possible response to this question is that it is one that should be 
answered by moral philosophers and not by economists whose science does 
not provide them with the tools needed to answer it. There are indeed some 
economists who have taken this position, but there are also a large number 
who have not, and this includes many of the most prominent characters in the 
history of the subject. The reasons for this are not difficult to see. On the one 
hand there is the fact that many economists – from Adam Smith to Amartya 
Sen - have had a foot in the camp of the moral philosophers, so that crossing 
the borders between the two fields has come naturally to them. On the other 
hand, there is the existence of the borderland between the two fields which is 
the study of the effects of redistribution policy. In order to understand the 
design and consequences of redistribution policy, one must know something 
both about economics and moral philosophy, and the attempts to combine 
them constitute the normative part of the study of income distribution.    
3.1. The normative economics of the classical school 
The natural starting point for economic theories of distributive justice is the 
distribution of income that is generated by the market economy. Although the 
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main concern of the classical economists was with the positive analysis of 
income distribution, they were also concerned with ethical issues and with the 
evaluation of redistribution policy.  
Adam Smith 
A point of reference for the classical view of this issue is Adam Smith’s theory 
of the invisible hand. In the most famous single passage in the Wealth of 
Nations, he claims that each individual, by pursuing his self-interest also 
promotes the interest of society: 
“He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his 
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part 
of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the 
society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” 
(Smith 1776; 1976, p. 456.)    
The most common interpretation of this passage is that private incentives 
operating in the context of a market economy promote an efficient use of 
resources in the sense of maximizing “the annual revenue of society”, although 
this interpretation is not undisputed21. Does it also promote a just distribution 
of income? There is no systematic discussion of this in the Wealth of Nations, 
although most readers of the book will find it reasonably clear that this was not 
his view. It is remarkable, therefore, to find in Smith’s other main work, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), a paragraph in which he makes the claim 
that the rich, without intending to do so, promote the interests of the poor. His 
statement of this claim is also of interest because it contains the second of his 
three uses of the metaphor of the invisible hand22. The rich, he says 
                                                          
21 For a discussion of alternative interpretations of the meaning of Smith’s statement of the 
invisible hand see Chapter 3 of Sandmo (2011). 
22 The third use occurs in his essay on the history of astronomy. 
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“… in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean 
only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose 
from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the 
gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with 
the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an 
invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries 
of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into 
equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the society.” (Smith 1759; 
1976, pp. 184-185.)  
The proposition that the distribution of necessaries is almost the same as if the 
economic system had been designed with a view to an equal distribution is 
certainly a striking one, although one should note that there is no claim that the 
income that finances the consumption over and above that level is distributed 
in a similar fashion. The self-interest of the rich is claimed to guarantee a 
certain minimum income to the poor, but not to the extent of leading to 
equality of living standards. Almost regardless of one’s interpretation of the 
substantial content of this proposition, it is difficult to see that Smith provides 
any convincing support for it, and it is hardly surprising that this version of the 
invisible hand has had little influence on subsequent thinking about income 
distribution.    
 Going back to The Wealth of Nations, although it does not contain any 
systematic discussion of the normative aspects of the distribution of income, 
there are many passages in the book that demonstrate Adam Smith’s concern 
with inequality and poverty as well his sympathy for the poor. One example is 
his positive attitude towards trade unions, which leads him to suggest that it is 
an inconsistency of economic policy to allow employers to collude while 
forbidding workmen to form trade unions (Smith 1776; 1976, pp. 83-85). 
Another example which, although in itself of minor importance, is suggestive 
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of his attitude, is his discussion of the system of the tolls that should be 
charged for different types of public transport. The principle that was most 
commonly used at Smith’s time was that of charging according to the weight 
of the carriage. He argues against this principle and in favour of the alternative 
of charging higher rates for luxury carriages and lower rates for carriages of 
necessity. Such a reform, he argues, would have the effect that “the indolence 
and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief 
of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the 
different parts of the country.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 725). 
A clearer statement of Smith’s more general perspective on the distribution of 
income between rich and poor comes in a passage that follows a discussion of 
the effects of lower prices of necessities: 
“Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people 
to be regarded as an advantage or as an inconveniency to the society? The 
answer seems at first sight abundantly plain. Servants, labourers and 
workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great 
political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part 
can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can 
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who 
feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a 
share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well 
fed, cloathed and lodged.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 96). 
It is clear from the context that Smith meant this statement to apply even to the 
case where the improvements in the standard of living of the lower ranks were 
achieved at some cost to the higher ranks of society. 
What consequences did Smith draw for redistributive policy? Here we must 
keep in mind that the instruments available for redistributive policy were 
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limited in number in Smith’s time, so that his policy recommendations were 
mostly incidental, as in the above passage concerning charges for public 
transport. His discussion of taxation in Book V of the Wealth of Nations is not 
very explicit when it comes to the redistributive effects of the tax system as a 
whole; he is content to discuss the main categories of taxes one by one with 
apparently little regard for the overall impact of the tax system. However, this 
discussion is introduced by the presentation of four normative “maxims” of 
taxation, and in the first of these we find the following principle: 
“The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective 
abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy 
under the protection of the state. In the observation or neglect of this 
maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.” 
(Smith 1776; 1976, p. 825). 
The principle may not be entirely clear to the modern reader and could be 
interpreted in two different ways. The first part of the passage indicates that 
the principle is one of ability to pay while the second part might suggest that 
we should read it as a recommendation of the benefit principle, according to 
which taxes should be seen as payment for services rendered by the state. 
However, the most reasonable interpretation of the term “revenue” is 
“income”; a central service that the state provides is security of private 
income, so that income is both a measure of ability to pay and benefits 
received. Thus, the tax system as a whole should be as nearly as possible 
proportionate to income. It is important to note that this is not a 
recommendation for the form of an income tax – about which Smith has little 
to say – but for the more general design of the tax system as a whole. 
Malthus and Ricardo on the Poor Laws 
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While redistributive taxation played little role at the time of the early classical 
economists, the form that support for the poor should take was a major issue of 
public policy23. There was widespread concern over the established system of 
poor relief, which provided assistance both to those too sick or too old to work 
and to those who were able to work but found it difficult or impossible to earn 
a living. Malthus applied his theory of population to this issue and argued that 
support for the poor would not in the long run improve their position in 
society. Because the provision of a minimum standard of living would 
encourage the poor to have more children, in the long run they would not be 
better off on an individual basis; there would simply be a larger number of 
poor people in society. In addition, the resulting increase of population would 
drive up the price of food and cause more workers to rely on poor relief: 
“They [the poor laws] may be said, therefore, to create the poor which they 
maintain; and as the provisions of the country must, in consequence of the 
increased population, be distributed to every man in smaller proportions, it 
is evident that the labour of those who are not supported by parish 
assistance will purchase a smaller quantity of provisions than before, and 
consequently more of them must be driven to apply for assistance.” 
(Malthus 1803; 1992, p. 100.) 
Malthus therefore recommended the abolition of the poor laws in order to 
increase the incentives of the able-bodied poor to provide for themselves 
through their own work. In this he received strong support from other 
prominent economists, in particular from his friend David Ricardo. According 
to Ricardo, “the comforts and well-being of the poor” cannot be secured 
without some effort of their own, especially to regulate the increase in their 
numbers. But, he argued, 
                                                          
23 The history of thought regarding public policy towards the poor is discussed both more 
broadly and in more depth in Martin Ravallion’s chapter in the present Handbook. 
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“The operation of the system of poor laws has been directly contrary to 
this. They have rendered restraint superfluous, and have invited 
imprudence, by offering it a portion of the wages of prudence and industry. 
The nature of the evil points out the remedy. By gradually contracting the 
sphere of the poor laws; by impressing on the poor the value of 
independence, by teaching them that they must look not to systematic and 
casual charity, but to their own exertions for support, that prudence and 
forethought are neither unnecessary nor unprofitable virtues, we shall by 
degrees approach a sounder and more healthful state.” (Ricardo 1817; 
1951, p. 107.)   
In a stark form the critique of the poor laws introduced a theme that was 
destined to become a major issue in the economic analysis of poverty and 
redistribution: The possible conflict between the objectives of justice (poor 
relief) and efficiency (labour supply). Later classical economists, in particular 
Nassau William Senior who was chairman of the 1832 Royal Commission on 
the poor laws, strongly recommended a reform of the system that ensured that 
poor relief would never be organized in such a way as to make it more 
attractive than to earn one’s living by regular work.  
Mill 
John Stuart Mill is known as one of the most prominent spokesmen for the 
philosophy of utilitarianism, which he expounded in particular in his book 
Utilitarianism (1863). One might expect then that in his Principles he would 
use the utilitarian approach to evaluate income inequality, but this perspective 
is in fact absent from his analysis24. Like in the case of Adam Smith, we 
search in vain for a unified theoretical principle that can be used to evaluate 
income distribution from a normative point of view. On the other hand, there 
                                                          
24 The last edition of the Principles that appeared during Mill’s lifetime was the 7th, which 
came out in 1871. Thus, he clearly had the opportunity to use material from Utilitarianism for 
this purpose. 
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are numerous opportunities to gain insight into his views on distribution from 
his discussion of more specific issues. 
On such issue is that of inheritance. Although Mill supports each individual’s 
rights to the fruits of his own labour and property, he draws a line when it 
comes to income from inherited property. In a passage that may have been 
more controversial to his readers than he indicates (Mill 1848; 1965, p. 218), 
he writes that “although the right of bequest, or gift after death, forms part of 
the idea of private property, the right of inheritance, as distinguished from 
bequest, does not.” He therefore supports restrictions regarding inheritance in 
the form of limits on how much an individual may be allowed to receive. His 
arguments for such restrictions run partly in the form of incentives: While 
restrictions on how much a parent is allow to leave to his children may weaken 
the parent’s desire to accumulate wealth, this is outweighed by the adverse 
incentives to work and save that arise for children who receive large amounts 
of wealth that they have done nothing to deserve. But he also defends the 
proposed restrictions by its distributional consequences. If children’s 
inheritance were to be limited to some maximum amount, 
“… the benefit would be great. Wealth which could no longer be employed 
in “over”-enriching a few, would either be devoted to objects of public 
usefulness, or if bestowed on individuals, would be distributed among a 
larger number.” (Mill 1848: 1965, p. 226.)      
According to Mill, therefore, there is a social benefit associated with a more 
even distribution of wealth25.  
Another issue is that of the most desirable form of taxation. In his chapter “On 
the General Principles of Taxation” (Mill 1848: 1965, Book V, Chapter II) 
Mill cites with approval Adam Smith’s four maxims on taxation. After having 
                                                          
25 A century later, Mill’s recommendations were echoed by Meade (1964), who proposed 
progressive taxes both on wealth and inheritance for the purpose of achieving a more equal 
distribution of the ownership of property. 
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quoted them in verbatim he comments that while their meaning is mostly clear, 
the maxim that is concerned with equality in taxation (and which was cited 
above) requires further examination since it is concerned with a concept that is 
often imperfectly understood. He then states that the fundamental principle of 
equality in taxation is equality of sacrifice, which means “… apportioning the 
contribution of each person towards the expenses of government, so that he 
shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment 
than every other person experiences from his.” (P. 807). He then goes on to 
discuss the consequences of this general principle for the design of the income 
tax. Although expressing some sympathy for the idea of a graduated income 
tax, he concludes in favour of a linear tax in which e.g. the first 50 pounds of 
income is tax exempt while the excess income is taxed at a constant rate. He 
also recommends that saving be exempt from taxation, the main argument 
being that taxing the parts of income that are devoted to consumption and 
saving at the same rate involves a “double taxation of saving” and therefore a 
disincentive to saving and investment.      
Mill’s tax policy recommendations emerge as a compromise between the 
abstract idea of equal sacrifice and more ad hoc considerations, but it is 
difficult to see to what extent his conclusions can be derived from the 
philosophical principles of utilitarianism. In his book Utilitarianism (Mill 
1863; 1969, p. 254-255) there is a brief discussion of alternative concepts of 
justice in taxation, but the text is rather inconclusive: Mill describes alternative 
points of view that give support to a head tax, a proportional tax or progressive 
taxation. He then states that “[f]rom these confusions there is no other mode of 
extrication than the utilitarian.” However, he does not conclude as to the form 
of taxation that would follow from the application of utilitarian principles, and 
as we have seen this connection is not clear in his discussion in the Principles 
either. 
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It may seem surprising that John Stuart Mill, an intellectual known for his 
radical sympathies, should not have come out more strongly in favour of 
redistributive taxation. The main explanation is probably that he saw taxation 
as being of secondary importance in this regard in comparison to structural 
reforms aiming to expand the range of choice open to all layers of society. 
Such reforms would include better education for the lower classes, ending the 
restrictions on entry into various occupations as well the discrimination of 
women in the labour market. The latter issue was one that he considered to be 
of special importance. He wrote the influential book On the Subjection of 
Women (Mill 1869), and in the Principles he wrote:  
“Let women who prefer that occupation [as a wife and mother]; adopt it, 
but that there should be no option, no other carrière possible for the great 
majority of women, except in the humbler departments of life, is a flagrant 
social injustice.” (Mill 1848: 1965, p. 765.) 
It is notable that it was to take more than a century for the gender issue once 
again to make its appearance in the normative economics of inequality and 
income distribution.  
3.2. The neoclassical economists: Efficiency and justice 
With the emergence of marginalism and the neoclassical school of economic 
theory there began a more systematic exploration of the optimality properties 
of the market allocation of resources and in particular the relationship between 
on the one hand the efficiency of the market economy and on the other hand 
the distributive justice of its allocation of resources. In the long run perspective 
of the history of ideas the neoclassical interest in these issues may be seen as a 
desire to clarify Adam Smith’s proposition that the invisible hand of the 
market led to a result that was in conformity with “the publick interest.”   
Walras 
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The three main protagonists of the marginalist revolution paid little attention to 
the role of the competitive market system in the determination of income 
distribution and even less to the ethical aspects of it. Among the three 
however, Léon Walras is notable for raising an issue that goes back to Adam 
Smith’s theory of the invisible hand and the ability of the market mechanism 
to function in a way that is consistent with the public interest. Towards the end 
of his detailed analysis of exchange in a two-commodity world he wrote that  
“[the] exchange of two commodities for each other in a perfectly 
competitive market is an operation by which all holders of either one, or of 
both, of the two commodities can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction 
of their wants consistent with the condition that the two commodities are 
bought and sold at one and the same rate of exchange throughout the 
market.” (Walras 1874-77; 1954, p. 143.) 
The context makes it clear that Walras meant the conclusion to apply beyond 
the simple case of two commodities and pure exchange, so it must be 
understood as a more general characterization of a competitive economy. 
The characterization can be read as a modernized version of Smith’s statement 
about the invisible hand; however, it can be interpreted in two different ways. 
Several economists have taken the view that the expression “the greatest 
possible satisfaction of their wants” refers to the collective society of all 
individuals; according to this interpretation, Walras says that the competitive 
equilibrium generates the greatest possible satisfaction of wants for society as 
a whole. In this perspective, Walras comes out as a rather naïve apologetic for 
the free market system. The other interpretation is obviously that each 
individual can obtain the greatest possible satisfaction of wants for himself. 
There can in fact be no doubt that the second interpretation is the correct 
representation of Walras’ position. On the one hand he insists that his 
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analytical description of the competitive market has no broader normative 
significance:  
“Though our description of free competition emphasizes the problem of 
utility, it leaves the question of justice entirely to one side.” (Walras 1874-
77; 1954, p. 257.) 
On the other hand, he emphasizes the non-comparability of utility, so that he 
must have rejected the notion that there exists such a thing as wants 
satisfaction for society as a whole. 
On the latter point, however, we have evidence that for Walras, at least in this 
case, old habits of thought died hard. In a letter to the German economist 
Wilhelm Launhard in 1885 Walras defends himself against the charge that he 
had maintained that competition necessarily led to maximum satisfaction for 
society as a whole. Suppose, he argues, that commodities can be sold at a low 
price to the poor and a high price to the rich. The rich would then have to give 
up some consumption of “superfluous” goods, while the poor would be better 
able to afford necessities. “Consequently, there would be a large increase in 
utility.” (Jaffé 1965, Vol. II, p. 50.) Here, utility evidently refers to aggregate 
or social utility; hence, there is an assumption, contrary to the statement in the 
Eléments, that individual utilities can be compared and aggregated.  
In addition to this lapse from theoretical consistency, the modern economist 
might also question Walras’ use of the example of price discrimination for 
consumer goods to illustrate redistribution policy. Clearly, an example that 
would both be more striking and more realistic would be redistribution of 
income from the rich to the poor. The consequences in terms of the 
consumption of luxuries and necessities would be the same, and the 
connection with policies that were within the realm of the feasible would be 
much stronger. 
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In  modern terminology, the conclusion to which Walras came close, although 
he did not manage to state it with great clarity, was that the market equilibrium 
was efficient although it did not necessarily result in a just distribution of 
resources and income. Although imperfectly formulated, this insight was a 
step forward in the understanding of the connection between the market 
mechanism as a system for efficient resource allocation and as a determinant 
of the distribution of income and welfare between individuals in society. The 
insight was to be further studied and clarified by the next generation of 
marginalist thinkers of whom the most important were Alfred Marshall and 
Walras’ successor in Lausanne, Vilfredo Pareto.  
Marshall 
What were Marshall’s views regarding the normative aspects of income 
distribution? In welfare economics, Marshall is chiefly remembered for his 
invention of the partial equilibrium concept of the social surplus (the sum of 
producers’ and consumers’ surplus) which can be measured as the area 
between the demand and marginal cost curves. Since this area achieves its 
maximum at the point of intersection between the two curves, i.e. at the 
competitive equilibrium, Marshall was able to conclude that 
“a position of (stable) equilibrium of demand and supply is a position also 
of maximum satisfaction.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 470.) 
This is a conclusion very similar to that of Walras, although Marshall was 
more careful in qualifying it so as to avoid misunderstandings. It is obvious 
that he meant the conclusion to apply beyond the simple case of an individual 
commodity to the general equilibrium of demand and supply, including the 
markets for the factors of production. And although the term maximum 
satisfaction was meant to apply to society as a whole, Marshall emphasizes 
that it is an aggregate measure which is built on the assumption that 
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“all differences in wealth between the different parties concerned may be 
neglected, and that the satisfaction which is rated at a shilling by any one 
of them, may be taken as equal to one that is rated at a shilling by any 
other.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 471.) 
He then argues that if e.g. it were the case that the producers as a class were 
much poorer than the consumers, “aggregate satisfaction” might be increased 
by a restriction of supply that would, assuming demand to be inelastic, 
increase the income of the producers. The terminology here is apt to be 
confusing, since it seems strange to argue that aggregate satisfaction can be 
increased by moving away from a position of maximum satisfaction. But quite 
apart from the terminology, the underlying argument is clearly based on the 
utilitarian assumption of decreasing marginal utility: 
“It is in fact only a special case of the broad proposition that the aggregate 
satisfaction can primâ facie be increased by the distribution, whether 
voluntarily or compulsorily, of some of the property of the rich among the 
poor.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 471-472.) 
In his concluding chapter on “Progress in relation to the standards of life” he 
becomes at the same time more explicit and more cautious regarding the 
desirability of less inequality: 
“The drift of economic science during many generations has been with 
increasing force towards the belief that there is no real necessity, and 
therefore no moral justification for extreme poverty side by side with great 
wealth. The inequalities of wealth though less than they are often 
represented to be, are a serious flaw in our economic organization. Any 
diminution of them which can be attained by means that would not sap the 
springs of free initiative and strength of character, and would not therefore 
materially check the growth of the national dividend, would seem to be a 
clear social gain.” (Marshall 1890; 1920, p. 713-714.) 
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This is a forceful expression of the view that excessive inequality is a social 
evil, and one notes also Marshall’s claim that this moral judgment can claim 
the support of economic science. On the other hand, the desirability of a move 
towards increased equality must take account of the possibility that it might 
weaken productivity and economic incentives, a point of view that would 
become a cornerstone in the analysis of welfare state policies that was to 
occupy the work of many economists in the coming generations.  
What would be the means that could be used to achieve reduced inequality? 
On this topic Marshall’s Principles has less to contribute. There is the 
emphasis on education as a means of improving one’s position in society but 
little attention to the possibility of compulsory redistribution that he alludes to. 
Foremost among the instruments of such redistribution is taxation, but there is 
hardly any systematic discussion of the principles of taxation in Marshall’s 
book, and what mention there is, is mostly incidental and for the most part 
relegated to footnotes or appendices. This is in marked contrast to the treatises 
of Smith, Ricardo and Mill, in which issues of taxation (as well as public 
expenditure) occupied a major part of their presentation of the principles of 
economics. A possible explanation of this neglect on the part of Marshall is 
that he initially saw his Principles as the first of a work in two volumes, where 
the second volume was to contain the application of theory to several areas of 
economic policy; a sketch of the proposed contents of Volume 2 dated in 
October 1887 lists “Taxation” as one of six such areas, while in 1903 “Public 
finance” had become one of nine areas. When his Industry and Trade was 
finally published in 1919 these topics were no longer parts of the content of 
the book26. 
J. B. Clark 
                                                          
26 An interesting study of Marshall’s plans for a second – and a third and 
possibly a fourth – volume of the Principles is Whitaker (1990). 
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John Bates Clark was a pioneer of the modern marginalist thinking in the 
United States who introduced the concepts of marginal productivity and 
marginal utility both in academic and more popular writings. But his 1899 
book The Distribution of Wealth, has become less known for its restatement of 
marginal productivity theory (which is its main focus) than for what Stigler 
(1941) refers to as its “naïve productivity ethics.” In Clark’s view, the equality 
between factor prices and marginal value productivity was not just a 
descriptive theory of how the market worked; it was also the manifestation of a 
natural law. This view is expressed already on the first page of the preface: 
“It is the purpose of this work to show that the distribution of the 
income of society is controlled by a natural law, and that this law, if it 
worked without friction, would give to every agent of production the 
amount of wealth which that agent creates.” (Clark 1899, p. v.) 
This statement may be read simply as a characterization of factor market 
equilibrium under perfect competition although it raises the issue of how an 
agent’s marginal productivity can be identified with “what he creates”. Clark 
maintained that this problem was less complex than many people thought, for 
it was essentially of the same nature as that which arose in a simple frontier 
society: 
“In particular, it is necessary to know that the primitive law which puts 
a man face to face with nature and makes him dependent on what he 
personally can make her yield to him is still, in essence, the law of the 
most complex economy.” (Clark 1899, p. 37.) 
A further and crucial issue is whether the distribution that results from the 
operation of the law is just. On this point there is a certain ambivalence in 
Clark’s exposition. On the one hand he says that this question lies outside his 
enquiry, “for it is a matter of pure ethics” (p. 8). On the other hand, he argues 
that what he creates belongs to the agent by right, and that nobody can 
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complain if he is paid according to what he creates. The competitive 
distribution of income is therefore both fair and consistent with social stability, 
for if some agents are paid less than what they create 
“there would be at the foundation of the social structure an explosive 
element which sooner or later would destroy it.” (Clark 1899, p. 9.) 
Although most modern economists will no doubt find Clark’s “productivity 
ethics” unconvincing, there are also elements in his thought that have been 
taken up by others. The most obvious parallel is the analysis by the 
philosopher Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 
1974). Nozick’s basic idea is what he calls the entitlement theory of 
distributive justice. Any distribution that reflects an acquisition of income or 
wealth that is considered to be fair, i.e. to have been fairly acquired according 
to certain axiomatic criteria, is just. Moreover, given such a distribution, there 
is no case for public redistribution of income. Although it is not linked to the 
marginal productivity theory of income distribution, Nozick’s theory evidently 
has some elements in common with the ideas of Clark. 
Pareto 
We have already encountered Pareto as an empirical researcher on income 
distribution. Although his influence in that area was significant, his 
contribution to welfare economics was more fundamental and of more lasting 
significance. It had important consequences for the way that economists 
thought about normative issues, including their views on income redistribution 
as a goal of economic policy. 
The starting point for Pareto’s welfare economics was his study of utility and 
demand. Arguing in his Manual of Political Economy that only an ordinal 
concept of utility was required as a foundation for the study of consumers’ 
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demand27, he went on to point out that this concept of utility did not lend itself 
to interpersonal comparisons: 
“The utility, or its index, for one individual, and the utility, or its index, 
for another individual, are heterogeneous quantities. We can neither 
add them together nor compare them … A sum of utility enjoyed by 
different individuals does not exist; it is an expression which has no 
meaning.” (Pareto 1909; 1971, p. 192.) 
From this it would seem to follow that the search for a criterion of aggregate 
utility or welfare would be in vain. However, Pareto went on to introduce his 
own criterion of social welfare or efficiency that we now call Pareto 
optimality: 
“We will say that the members of a collectivity enjoy maximum utility 
in a certain position when it is impossible to find a way of moving from 
that position very slightly in such a manner that the utility enjoyed by 
each of the individuals of that collectivity increases.” (Pareto 1909; 
1971, p. 261.) 
“Maximum utility” was clearly not a good name for this concept since it 
suggested precisely the type of aggregation that Pareto sought to avoid, but he 
may be excused for not inventing the term “Pareto optimality”. 
Pareto showed that a competitive equilibrium satisfied the conditions for 
optimality in this sense. From the assumption of incomparability it followed 
that his optimality criterion was unable to judge the welfare effects of a 
redistribution of income that led to diminished incomes for the rich and 
increased incomes for the poor because this would make the rich enjoy less 
utility and the poor more. If the economy were to find itself in a competitive 
                                                          
27 In order to distinguish this concept from that of cardinal utility, he even coined a new word, 
ophelimity (ophélimité) to represent it – a word that never caught on. In the quotations that 
follow, I have substituted “utility” for Pareto’s “ophelimity”. 
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equilibrium both before and after the redistribution of income, both states of 
the economy would satisfy the conditions for Pareto optimality, but the 
optimality criterion would not be able to rank the two situations relative to 
each other. Judgments about income distribution and redistribution in terms of 
justice or fairness should, according to this view, be regarded as occupying a 
position outside the field of economics as a scientific discipline. Although this 
interpretation is not very explicit in Pareto’s own work, it became a central 
proposition in the further elaboration of Paretian welfare economics that was 
carried out by a number of 20th century economists. But the acceptance of 
Pareto optimality as an important concept of welfare economics took a long 
time. As late as 1947 Paul Samuelson, after having presented the definition of 
Pareto optimality, could write that “it has not yet received attention from 
economists commensurate with the importance which he [Pareto] attached to 
it.” (Samuelson 1947, p. 212.) 
 
3.3. Utilitarianism and the economics of redistribution 
The insistence by Walras and even more strongly by Pareto on the subjective 
nature of utility might have been expected to lead to the total banishment of 
utilitarian philosophy from the normative analysis of income distribution. 
However, this did not happen. There were several reasons for this. One is that 
the work of Walras and especially Pareto did not become widely known in the 
international community of economists until well into the 20th century. 
Another was that utilitarianism continued to hold a strong attraction for 
economists in search of a philosophical foundation for their egalitarian 
convictions and for the design of redistributive policy, particularly in the tax 
field. 
Maximizing the sum of utilities 
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A good example of such an economist is Francis Ysidro Edgeworth. He 
adopted the view of the older utilitarians that social welfare should be seen as 
the sum of individual utilities but was critical of the use that they made of it, 
pointing out that it was difficult to see, in the absence of mathematical 
formalization, how their conclusions followed from their ethical premises. In 
his book New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877) he built on the analogy with 
the Weber-Fechner Law in psychology, which stated that the perception of a 
sensual stimulus increases less than proportionally with the strength of the 
stimulus, to argue that utility must increase less than proportionally with 
income. From this he drew strong conclusions for the socially optimal 
distribution of income. In the case of a given total income to be divided 
between all members of society the optimal distribution would be one of 
complete equality, assuming that all individuals had the same utility function 
of income. He also analyzed the case of variable work effort and found that 
under certain assumptions those with the greatest capacity should do the most 
work.  
 A related approach was that of Pigou. In his Economics of Welfare (1920) he 
used an explicit utilitarian argument – although without reference to the 
Weber-Fechner Law - to argue in favour of redistribution of income from the 
rich to the poor: 
“… it is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich 
man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables 
more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, 
must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. The old “law of 
diminishing [marginal] utility” thus leads securely to the proposition: 
Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the 
hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the 
size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, 
increase economic welfare.” (Pigou 1920; 1932, p. 89.) 
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In other words, it is assumed that there exists a utility function of income that 
is concave and the same for everybody. In the following pages the proviso of 
“similar temperament” is spelled out further. Pigou admits that under existing 
social conditions a rich man may in fact be able to produce more utility from 
any given amount of income than a poor man. But this advantage has come 
about through past inequalities of income and the standard of living and cannot 
therefore be used to argue against income equalization: In the long run the 
poor who experience increased incomes will be as able as the current rich to 
generate utility from their income. The last part of the quotation introduces an 
important qualification: Policies that aim to redistribute income from the rich 
to the poor may have an adverse effect on incentives, in particular on the 
incentives to work and save. This may lead to a reduction of the national 
dividend or national income so that there will be less income available for 
distribution.  
In analytical terms we might restate this argument as saying that if there are no 
incentive effects of redistribution it should be carried to the point where the 
marginal utility of income is the same for all; in the case of identical tastes this 
would imply complete equalization of incomes, as in the analysis of 
Edgeworth. If incentive effects are present, the optimal amount of 
redistribution would stop short of this point, with the gap between the marginal 
utility of income between rich and poor determined by the strength of the 
incentive effects.  
Critique of utilitarianism 
The assumptions of identical utility functions, decreasing marginal utility and 
interpersonal comparability of utility all became the subject of critical scrutiny 
as Pareto’s work on demand theory and welfare economics became more 
widely known. Since these assumptions had been shown to be unnecessary for 
the study of consumer demand they were also held to be inappropriate for 
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making welfare judgments. Justifications of income redistribution such as that 
advanced by Pigou gradually came to be viewed as non-scientific and simply 
subjective expressions of one’s personal taste for income equality. On the 
desirability of redistribution, economics as a science would have to remain 
silent. This view was particularly forcefully put in the influential book by 
Lionel Robbins (1932). 
Robbins’ influence is clearly discernible in the New Welfare Economics that 
was developed by several writers during the 1930s and ‘40s. In the 
reformulation of welfare theory by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947) a 
crucial role was played by the social welfare function that depicted social 
welfare as an increasing function of individual utility levels, represented by 
ordinal utility functions. The conditions for social welfare maximization could 
then be stated as two set of conditions. One set described the conditions for 
Pareto optimal allocation of factors of production and consumer goods, while 
the other represented the conditions for optimal distribution of goods between 
consumers – i.e. optimal income distribution – as requiring equality of the 
social marginal utility of income between individuals28. While the new 
formulation made clear the distinction between welfare judgments related to 
efficiency on the one hand and distributive justice on the other, the generality 
of the conditions that Samuelson (1947) referred to as the interpersonal 
optimal conditions was such that it became virtually impossible to draw any 
conclusion regarding the socially desirable form of income redistribution. At 
the most general level of analysis, the only conclusion that could be drawn 
from the analysis was that the desirable extent of redistribution was 
determined by one’s ethical beliefs. Regarding the form of redistribution, 
however, the analysis had rather strong implications: In order to achieve a full 
optimum of social welfare, redistribution ought to be carried out by means of 
                                                          
28 Pareto optimality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a maximum of an 
individualistic social welfare function. 
74 
 
instruments that did not lead to violation of the efficiency conditions. The only 
instruments that could achieve this were individualized lump sum taxes and 
transfers (although some economists, e.g. Hotelling (1938), implicitly assumed 
that the income tax was at least approximately equivalent to lump sum 
taxation). 
A comeback for utilitarianism   
While the new welfare economics helped to clarify the relationship between 
economists’ statements regarding efficiency and distributive justice, one might 
still ask whether the representatives of the new approach went too far in their 
rejection of the old welfare economics which was based on a cardinal 
definition of utility and interpersonal utility comparisons. This view has been 
argued by Cooter and Rappoport (1984), who maintain that the concepts of 
utility used by the post-Pareto ordinalist school and the older economists 
whom they refer to as the material welfare school were fundamentally 
different. The concept of utility employed by the material welfare school was 
not intended to represent the individual’s tastes but his needs, and these needs 
were assumed to be objectively observable as for instance in the form of 
physical fitness. To use this concept for interpersonal comparisons did not 
involve a comparison of subjective preferences but of empirically observable 
standards of living. The consumption goods that were bought using the 
individual’s income were used to produce his standard of living, but like other 
factors of production the goods obeyed the law of diminishing returns, which 
in this case was translated into the concept of diminishing marginal utility of 
income. It was this concept of utility that was used by economists like 
Edgeworth29 and Pigou to justify the recommendation of transfers to the poor 
and progressive taxation. The concreteness of the concept is well brought out 
                                                          
29 Samuelson (1947, p. 206) says that «to a man like Edgeworth, steeped as he was in the 
Utilitarian tradition, individual utility – nay social utility – was as real as his morning jam.» 
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in Hugh Dalton’s (1920) comment on Jevons’ (1871) discovery30 of the law of 
diminishing marginal utility. 
“From this law a practical conclusion of the greatest importance 
follows, namely, the extreme wastefulness from the point of view of 
economic welfare of large inequalities of income. It is obvious to the 
modern economist that, from this point of view, a considerable 
equalization of incomes is desirable, provided that production is not 
checked thereby. But before Jevons wrote, this was by no means 
obvious, or at any rate it was not widely perceived.” (Dalton 1920, p. 
90.) 
Dalton’s use of the word “wastefulness” is suggestive. In the new welfare 
economics framework this term would be meaningless, but in the approach 
taken by the material welfare school it has a concrete interpretation in terms of 
a smaller quantity of aggregate welfare which is due to the inequality of 
income. Given the way that income is distributed, it produces a smaller 
amount of material welfare or standard of living than that which would result 
from a more equal distribution.  
A new justification for the utilitarian social welfare function arose in the early 
post-war period. It started with an article by William Vickrey (1945) which 
was apparently concerned with the possibility of measuring the marginal 
utility of income on the basis of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected 
utility hypothesis. But in the middle of the article Vickrey changed his focus to 
that of discussing the question of the socially optimal distribution of income. 
His approach is nicely summed up in the following statement: 
                                                          
30 Jevons was in fact not the first to formulate this principle. As he was later to acknowledge, 
Gossen (1854) had done so before him. Even earlier, although in a different context, the 
principle had been formulated by Bernoulli (1738).  For references and further discussion see 
Sandmo (2011). 
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“If utility is defined as that quantity the mathematical expectation of 
which is maximized by an individual making choices involving risk, 
then to maximize the aggregate of such utility over the population is 
equivalent to choosing that distribution of income which such an 
individual would select were he asked which of various variants of the 
economy he would like to become a member of, assuming that once he 
selects a given economy with a given distribution of income he has an 
equal chance of landing in the shoes of each member of it.” (Vickrey 
1945, p. 329.)  
The idea was developed further by several writers, including Marcus Fleming 
(1952) and John Harsanyi (1955b), neither of whom, however, referred to 
Vickrey’s work. Harsanyi’s article in particular showed how a utilitarian social 
welfare function, additive in individual utilities, could be derived from a set of 
axioms governing individual and social welfare judgments. Using this 
approach, one could go back to the issue raised by the earlier utilitarian 
economists and ask which distribution of a given amount of income would 
maximize social welfare. If social welfare can be expressed as an unweighted 
sum of individual utility functions, and if these functions are concave 
(representing risk averse attitudes), the answer would once again be that the 
optimal distribution would be one of complete equality. 
This implication was not emphasized by Harsanyi whose interests centered on 
the logical foundations for this particular social welfare function, not in its 
implications for social organization and economic policy. Vickrey on the other 
hand developed these implications in some detail, pointing out both the 
optimality of equal distribution if total income could be taken as fixed and the 
qualifications needed when one takes account of the objection that the total 
amount of income cannot in practice be taken as independent of the way it is 
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distributed.31 Therefore, he argued, “some degree of inequality is needed in 
order to provide the required incentives and stimuli to efficient cooperation of 
individuals in the production process.” (Vickrey 1945, p. 329). From this 
observation he proceeded to an attempt to determine the welfare maximizing 
amount of redistribution by calculating an optimal income tax function using 
the calculus of variations. He succeeded in deriving the Euler equation for this 
problem but concluded that “even in this simplified form the problem resists 
any facile solution.” (Vickrey 1945, p. 331.)  
There is a direct line from Vickrey’s analysis to the modern theory of optimal 
income taxation as pioneered by James Mirrlees (1971). Mirrlees also adopted 
the utilitarian assumption of social welfare as the sum of individual utility 
functions (which he also assumed to be identical) but without the choice 
theoretic foundation adopted by Vickrey and Harsanyi; it is also notable that 
he does not refer to Vickrey’s 1945 article. In the Mirrlees model individual 
utility functions depend on consumption (or income) and leisure. Lump sum 
taxation is ruled out as infeasible, and redistribution has to be carried out by 
means of a non-linear income tax that distorts the choice between leisure and 
consumption. The shape of the optimal income tax function accordingly has to 
reflect the tradeoff between equality and efficiency. By adopting some 
additional assumptions relative to Vickrey’s model Mirrlees was in fact able to 
characterize the optimal income tax function, although in rather general terms. 
More specific results were derived by a simulation analysis of special cases. A 
surprising feature of the optimal tax schedule that emerged from these 
numerical experiments was that although the average tax rate was increasing in 
income, the marginal tax rate tended to stay approximately constant and if 
                                                          
31 Vickrey’s argument is strongly reminiscent of that of Pigou in the Economics of Welfare, but 
he makes no reference to Pigou or any of the other early utilitarian economists. 
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anything showed a tendency to decline with income.32 Mirrlees’ contribution 
has led to a long line of refinements and extensions of his analysis, including a 
critical examination of the utilitarian foundations of the social welfare 
function. In the 1970s the book by the philosopher John Rawls (1972) created 
a great deal of interest among economists who were interested in public policy 
analysis, and Rawls’ “maxi-min” criterion by which the welfare criterion to be 
maximized is the utility of the least fortunate person in society, was applied to 
the problem of optimal income taxation by Atkinson (1973). His numerical 
results indicated that with this criterion the marginal tax rates and the degree of 
progression were likely to be considerably higher than in the case considered 
by Mirrlees. 
As an aside, it may be noted that a different argument for low marginal tax 
rates had earlier been discussed by Ragnar Frisch in an article published in 
Norwegian (Frisch 1948). Frisch based his argument on the distinction 
between what he called the internal and external marginal productivity of 
labour. The external marginal productivity in a particular sector refers to the 
effect on output in other sectors which is not taken into account in the 
employment decision. Frisch believed that this effect as a rule was positive, so 
that work effort tended to be too low in a market economy. This might call for 
a negative marginal tax rate33 which, however, was not practically feasible, “at 
least not at the present time.” Instead he suggested a zero marginal tax rate on 
the part of income that was directly related to effort, while the remainder of the 
individual’s income could be taxed according to a progressive scale. 
3.4. Sacrifice and benefit theories 
                                                          
32 Later work by several economists demonstrated that under certain assumptions the 
optimal marginal rate of income tax at the top of the income schedule should be equal to 
zero. For an interpretation of this result and further references see e.g. Sandmo (1999). 
33 Or in other words a Pigouvian subsidy to work effort, although Frisch does not use this 
terminology. 
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There are other ways to analyze the normative problems of redistribution than 
via social welfare maximization, and in this section we consider two of these. 
Equal sacrifice theories caught the attention of economists around the end of 
the 19th century and were for a time influential in policy debates. Benefit 
theories of taxation whereby taxes are seen as payment for benefits received 
from the state have traditionally had a strong appeal to those who look for 
fairness in the relationship between the individual and the state. 
Equal sacrifice 
The utilitarian approach to income distribution and taxation is sometimes 
referred to as an equal sacrifice theory. In the simple case which forms the 
starting point for the utilitarian analysis, pre-tax incomes are given and the 
government aims to collect a given amount of revenue by using individualized 
lump sum taxes to maximize the sum of identical and concave utility functions 
of income. The resulting optimal distribution of after-tax incomes is one of 
complete equality of income where the marginal utility of income is the same 
for all. The solution represent a minimum of aggregate sacrifice, since the 
outcome with equal marginal utilities of income is the maximum of total utility 
that can be obtained relative to the tax revenue that is to be collected. It is a 
solution of equal sacrifice between persons only in the sense of equal marginal 
sacrifice: The sacrifice of the last dollar paid in taxes is the same for all. 
It might be expected that some economists who thought about the just 
distribution of the tax burden should come to think that this notion of equal 
sacrifice had limited appeal. In the case of substantial inequality of pre-tax 
incomes, the loss of utility from going from the pre-tax to the after-tax 
situation will obviously differ between individuals, and if one thinks that this 
is unjust it is natural to look for some alternative notion of equal sacrifice that 
could be applied to such non-marginal changes in the distribution of income. 
This led to the development of equal sacrifice theories in the more specific 
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sense, and in particular the theories of equal absolute and equal proportional 
sacrifice; theories that were first discussed analytically by Cohen-Stuart (1889) 
and Edgeworth (1897). The criterion of equal absolute sacrifice)34 can be 
formalized as 
U(Y)-U(Y-T)=k. 
Here Y is pre-tax income and T is the amount of tax, while k is a constant that 
is the same for all taxpayers35, so that the sacrifice of utility that results from 
taxation is the same for all individuals. To see how the amount of tax varies 
with income according to this principle, one may take the derivative of the 
left-hand side of the equation with respect to Y, treating T as a function of Y.  
Solving for the marginal tax rate, we obtain 
dT/dY=[U’(Y-T)-U’(Y)]/U’(Y-T). 
One sees immediately that the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of 
income implies that the marginal tax rate is positive, but the assumption does 
not take us any further in supplying an argument for progressive taxation. In 
order to study the implications for progressivity, one can use the result to 
derive the elasticity of income after tax with respect to income before tax. For 
progressivity this should be less than one, but whether this is the case or not 
turns out to depend on whether the elasticity of the marginal utility of income 
is less than or greater than minus one. For the logarithmic function, where the 
elasticity is just minus one, equal sacrifice in this sense implies proportional 
rather than progressive taxation, as pointed out by Samuelson (1947, p. 227). 
From the point of view of the history of public finance, this conclusion is of 
                                                          
34 The central contributions of Cohen-Stuart and Edgeworth have been reprinted in Musgrave 
and Peacock (1958). The criterion of equal relative or proportional sacrifice, whereby the 
difference in utility levels is related to the before tax utility level, leads to slightly different 
conditions for progressive taxation but does not raise any new issues of principle. See 
Musgrave (1959, p. 96). 
35 k must reflect the government’s revenue requirement, so that T is higher, the higher is k. 
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particular interest, since it was for some time widely believed that the principle 
of equal sacrifice combined with the assumption of decreasing marginal utility 
of income was sufficient to justify progressive taxation36. 
Although the principle of equal sacrifice may have some appeal to economic 
intuition, the main reason that it has disappeared from the modern discussion 
of optimal redistribution must be that its assumptions are difficult to reconcile 
with the maximization of a social welfare function. From that perspective, the 
straightforward utilitarian approach is much more appealing. In addition, the 
equal sacrifice theory lends itself less easily to generalizations incorporating 
variable labour supply and the second best considerations introduced by the 
work of Mirrlees and others into the utilitarian framework. From this point of 
view, the equal sacrifice theory of income redistribution proved to be a 
sidetrack37.  
The benefit principle of taxation 
The utilitarian and related approaches to the issue of optimal income 
distribution considered the question of the just or fair distribution of income in 
isolation from the distributive effects of public expenditure. In the older 
literature, we have seen that Adam Smith recommended that the contributions 
of taxpayers should be in proportion to “the revenue which they respectively 
enjoy under the protection of the state,” and one interpretation of this rule is 
that taxes should be levied so as to correspond to the benefits that people 
received from the activities of the state. However, the further elaboration of 
the benefit principle of taxation mainly took place in the writings of a number 
                                                          
36 Cohen-Stuart (1889; 1958) surveys a number of earlier studies of this issue by German and 
Dutch writers who claimed that progressive taxation could be rationalized along these lines. 
See also the book by Blum and Kalven (1953) which surveys both economic and legal 
discussions of tax progressivity with emphasis on the arguments derived from equal sacrifice 
theories.. 
37 Or, as put by Edgeworth (1897, p. 566): “… whatever view we take of the relation of the 
principle of like sacrifice to pure utilitarianism, the sphere of its action independently of that 
supreme principle appears to be insignificant.” 
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of continental European economists during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Two different types of claims were made for the implementation of 
the benefit principle of taxation. The first was that taxes levied on individuals 
according to the benefits that they received from the provision of public goods 
would somehow establish a price system for public goods or publicly provided 
goods that would correspond to competitive prices for private goods with 
similar efficiency properties. This idea suffers from the weakness that at least 
for public goods in the proper sense these prices do not provide individuals 
with the incentives to reveal their true preferences so that they cannot fill the 
functions of the price mechanism in the private goods part of the economy. 
The second claim, which is the one that is relevant for the normative analysis 
of redistribution policy, is that the benefit principle represents justice in 
taxation and that it therefore is important for normative judgments about 
income distribution in a mixed economy. The best known statement of this 
position is that of Knut Wicksell (1896)38.  
The concept of just taxation as used by Wicksell is quite different from that 
employed by economists in the utilitarian tradition. Wicksell sees the 
relationship between government and citizens as basically one of exchange, 
and one that should be carried out on terms that are fair. The starting point for 
his argument is that no public project should be carried out unless society’s 
aggregate willingness to pay is at least as high as its costs. Given that this 
condition is satisfied, it ought to be possible to distribute the costs in such a 
manner that every citizen makes a gain from the exchange, and this is the 
principle of justice in taxation: “No-one can complain if he secures a benefit 
which he himself considers to be (greater or at least) as great as the price he 
has to pay.” (Wicksell 1896; 1958, p. 79.) From this he drew the conclusion 
that any political proposal about public projects should be voted on as a 
                                                          
38 The collection of translations edited by Musgrave and Peacock (1958) contains many of the 
most important contributions to this line of analysis by German, Italian and Swedish 
economists, including a central extract from Wicksell’s book.  
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balanced budget tax-expenditure “package”, and that it should only be passed 
on the basis of a unanimous vote. 
It may seem surprising that Wicksell with his reputation for political 
radicalism should favour a system that seems to exclude the possibility of 
income redistribution through the public budget. It is at this point that one has 
to keep his peculiar definition of “just taxation” in mind. Wicksell says 
explicitly that the principle does not take account of distributional issues. 
Given the distribution of income in society, Wicksell’s principle, as described 
here, does nothing more than assure that the adoption of any new public 
project does not harm any citizen.39 He also emphasizes that this principle, if 
adopted in the Swedish society of his own time, would be in the interests of 
the lower classes who in his view were exploited by the higher income groups 
to contribute to the financing of public projects that involved little or no 
benefit to themselves.  
However, Wicksell recognized that for this principle to be fully convincing 
both from an economic and ethical point of view, it would have to be 
embedded in a broader framework of distributive justice: “It is clear that 
justice in taxation tacitly presupposes justice in the existing distribution of 
property and income.” (Wicksell 1896; 1958, p. 108.) On this broader concept 
of justice, however, he has actually little to say, although he emphasizes that 
too much redistribution may harm the upper classes in a way that is harmful to 
society as a whole, since these classes “undeniably include a significant share 
of a nation’s intelligence and economic initiative.” (Wicksell 1896; 1958, p. 
117.)  
Wicksell’s analysis was followed up by his countryman Erik Lindahl whose 
monograph on the theory of taxation introduced the concept which later came 
                                                          
39 Wicksell later modified the unanimity requirement so as to apply to groups rather than 
individuals. 
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to be known as Lindahl prices (Lindahl 1919). In a later article he discussed in 
more detail the argument that the benefit principle had a claim to be 
considered a standard of justice in taxation. Here, on the one hand, he 
emphasized the broader concept of distributive justice in which the benefit 
principle had to be embedded40: 
“… justice in taxation is inextricably linked with justice in the 
distribution of property, since it would obviously be nonsense to speak 
of “a just portion of an unjust whole.”” (Lindahl 1928; 1958, p. 227.) 
On the other hand, Lindahl also argued that there did not necessarily exist any 
contradiction between the principles of benefit and ability to pay, since ability 
to pay could often be taken as a good indication of the benefit derived from 
public expenditure. On this point, Lindahl’s argument is reminiscent of Adam 
Smith’s first maxim of taxation which indicated that it would be possible for 
taxation simultaneously to reflect both the individual taxpayers’ ability to pay 
and the benefits that they received under the protection of the state.  
 
4. Concluding reflections 
A chapter of the history of economic thought regarding income distribution 
theories does not lend itself easily to a summary in the way of a few main 
conclusions. Looking back on a two hundred years long history, however, it 
does induce one to offer a few general reflections on the nature of the field and 
its development. Below, accordingly, I make a few remarks on two general 
issues. The first concerns the relationship of economic theory to empirical 
evidence, in particular before the time when econometrics was established as 
the main framework for empirical study. The second set of remarks relates to 
                                                          
40 The term “property” should here be interpreted in a broad sense as including all individual 
economic resources, including income. 
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Ricardo’s characterization of income distribution as the principal problem of 
economics: Does the history of economic thought confirm his view of the 
importance of the subject?  
Theory and evidence 
The present chapter has been primarily an account of theories of income 
distribution; to include also the statistical and empirical work that has been 
done over the two centuries covered by the survey would be impossible within 
the confines of a single article. However, a brief discussion may be in order 
regarding the connection between theoretical and empirical work during the 
period. Thus, an interesting question to consider is to what extent the theorists 
of income distribution were aware of and were influenced by the empirical 
work that was undertaken at about the same time. In particular, the 19th 
century witnessed the growth of official statistics covering both the 
development of national income and its distribution. 
The questions of awareness and influence are very general, and it is not easy to 
provide clear and simple answers. One reason for this is that the influence of 
empirical knowledge on economic theorists may have been rather indirect; 
some characteristics of the real economy may have been considered to be 
common knowledge, so that theorists saw no need to provide exact 
documentation. But one should realize that there was not always agreement 
about what that supposedly common knowledge actually was. A case in point 
is John Stuart Mill’s disagreement with Adam Smith regarding the structure of 
wages. As we have seen, Smith believed that labour market competition would 
ensure that occupational wage rates would tend to compensate for non-
economic advantages and disadvantages, whereas Mill claimed that quite to 
the contrary, wage differentials reinforced the inequalities arising from 
different working conditions. In the 18th century empirical data on this issue 
were presumably hard to come by; nevertheless, Smith does refer to empirical 
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observations in support of his hypothesis, although by modern standards these 
references are both incomplete and unsystematic. By the middle of the next 
century, however, the situation had changed and it would have been possible 
for Mill to provide if not direct evidence at least some empirical illustrations 
that could throw light on this matter and more generally on the distribution of 
income. But he obviously felt no need to do this. Well into the next century, 
Hicks (1932) wrote about the effects of competition on the structure of wages 
with hardly any reference to empirical relationships. In fact, the only instance 
in which he does refer to empirical evidence is where he cites data for wages 
of agricultural labourers in Lancashire in 1794, showing how they vary with 
the distance to the nearest manufacturing centre41.  
To blame the economists of the 18th and 19th centuries for not supplying 
formal statistical tests of their theories would of course be pointless, since at 
that time econometrics was not even in its infancy (see Morgan 1990). What 
one might nevertheless have expected was a greater interest in drawing on data 
that could illustrate the importance and relevance of theoretical reasoning. 
From this point of view, a more striking instance of the lack of connection 
between theoretical and empirical work is Knut Wicksell’s belief that real 
wages had not risen significantly over the past two centuries, as seen from the 
perspective of 1901. At that time there had actually accumulated a large 
amount of statistical data documenting the significant rise in real wages during 
the 19th century in countries such as Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the 
United States (see e.g. Bresciani-Turroni 1939) as well as the Scandinavian 
countries. The data for Germany were particularly extensive and at Wicksell’s 
time had been used in academic studies by several German economists. 
Wicksell read (and wrote) German, but for whatever reason this work had little 
or no influence on his own thinking. If he had utilized it, he would have seen 
                                                          
41 These data were drawn from Redford (1926). 
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that his belief was firmly rejected by the empirical evidence42. But at least on 
this particular issue, he must have felt no need to confront his theoretical 
conclusions with statistical evidence43.  
The history of the interaction – or lack of it – between theorists and empirical 
researchers in the study of income distribution is a large topic in itself which 
cannot be surveyed here, particularly since it cannot be separated from the 
broader issue of the connection between theoretical and empirical research in 
economics more generally. The present examples of the lack of such a 
connection should simply be taken as an indication that at least in the pre-
econometric age there were sometimes large gaps between theoretical and 
empirical insights.  
The principal problem of political economy? 
Towards the end of this review of the development of theories of income 
distribution, it is natural to reconsider the quotation from Ricardo with which 
we began. Is Ricardo’s view reflected in the actual importance that the theory 
of income distribution has had in the history of economics? It may well have 
been true that Ricardo in this way expressed his conviction of the nature of 
economics, but his vision must be interpreted in light of the state of the science 
at the time in which he lived as well as the nature of society. To a modern 
economist, the proposition that the functional distribution of income between 
workers, capitalists and landowners should be considered the most important 
problem in economics will hardly be a convincing one. One of the reasons 
why Ricardo gave such emphatic priority to the problem may have been a 
                                                          
42 In the case of Sweden, later economic historians have found that real wages increased at 
an annual rate of more than two per cent during the period 1860-1895 (Phelps Brown and 
Browne 1968). Although these particular statistics were not available to Wicksell, it is hard to 
imagine that this growth was not noticeable for people living at the time. 
43 Wicksell must also have known several economists and statisticians who had personal 
experience of the empirical work. Thus, he had extensive contacts with Norwegian 
economists, among whom was Anders Nicolai Kiær who was an acknowledged expert on 
income and wealth statistics.  
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conviction that the analysis of this issue also went far to explain the personal 
distribution in a society with a modest degree of mobility between social and 
economic classes. Another reason may have been that he did not see the 
economic theory of his day as providing a set of analytical tools and concepts 
that would be useful in a more disaggregated analysis of the personal 
distribution of income. 
All this has of course changed. With the marginalist revolution of the late 
nineteenth century, economists acquired a set of theoretical tools that gradually 
came to improve their opportunities for analysis of both the positive and 
normative aspects of income distribution. But to what extent did they exploit 
these opportunities? When one reads the contributions of the early marginalists 
it becomes obvious that they applied their new theories mainly to the 
explanation of price formation in the market for commodities and less so in the 
markets for factors of production. When the general equilibrium followers of 
Walras put the finishing touches to the neoclassical theory of competitive 
markets, commodities and factors were treated symmetrically with the result 
that less attention was given to the special features of the markets for labour, 
capital and natural resources. Labour economics was for a long time 
considered to be a field on the outskirts of theory-based economics, and the 
literature on financial markets paid little or no attention – and continues to pay 
little or no attention - to the study of the personal distribution of income and 
wealth. Only in recent decades has formal economic theory begun to catch up 
on its neglect of the determination of income distribution. But this neglect is 
still visible in the allocation of space in introductory textbooks and books on 
microeconomic theory. 
These remarks pertain in particular to the positive economics of income 
distribution. But the attention to normative issues has fluctuated even more. 
Questions of distributive justice were certainly discussed by the classical 
economists but without the benefit of a formal theoretical structure. With the 
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breakthrough of marginal utility theory the situation changed, and many 
economists saw no objection to utilizing the hypothesis of decreasing marginal 
utility both to explain consumer demand and to justify the utilitarian argument 
in favour of income equality. This approach suffered a setback in the early 
nineteenth century with the adoption of ordinalism and the ideas of a value-
free science. Later on it once again became accepted that welfare economics 
could make an important contribution in clarifying the borderline between 
statements of facts and values, while since the 1960s, as Atkinson (2001) has 
pointed out, many modern textbooks seem to have adopted the view that the 
basic elements of welfare economics do not form a central part of the training 
of the modern economist. In regard to the theory of income distribution, many 
economists seem be held back from a discussion of distributive justice 
presumably because it will lead them into areas where they have to confront 
issues that are of an ethical or philosophical nature.44  
The desirable awareness of the relationship between positive and normative 
approaches to issues of income distribution may also be promoted through 
better knowledge of the history of thought in the area. Here there is definitely 
room for improvement. History provides many examples of how new theories 
have been formulated without apparent awareness of the work of earlier 
economists. As an example, the modern theory of optimal income taxation 
could probably have been developed and presented with a broader appeal to 
the general economics profession if it had been set in the context of the work 
by earlier utilitarian economists such as Edgeworth and Pigou. It is undeniable 
that economics has many of the features of a cumulative science in which new 
theories replace old ones because of their higher explanatory power or because 
they lead to better insights in the problems that arise in the design of economic 
policy. But even a cumulative science can benefit from awareness of its roots. 
                                                          
44 A reviewer of my book on the history of economic thought (Sandmo 2011) wrote that «I 
hate the word social justice because I do not know what it means.» 
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